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BUSINESS CYCLES AND AMERICAN DREAMS:
(DIS) AGGREGATE FLUCTUATIONS AND INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY
KAILIE DRESCHER
2020
In this thesis, I test my central hypothesis that aggregate economic fluctu-
ations (business cycles) affect intergenerational economic mobility (American
dreams). I exploit heterogeneity across U.S. state-level business cycles. I argue
that these cycles impose countercyclical credit constraints on households that
rely on credit to invest in the human capital of their children. Thus, credit
constraints effectively limit the skills and expected earnings of children.
I focus on an empirical measure of absolute mobility that Chetty et al.
(2017) propose: the rate of absolute income mobility, which measures the frac-
tion of adult children who earn more than their parents earned, conditional
on the parent’s income rank in their income distribution. My dataset includes
state-level rates of absolute income mobility for children in the birth cohorts
1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980.
My panel regressions pair state-level estimates of the rate of absolute income
mobility for a particular birth cohort—the dependent variable—with state-
level measures of the business cycle during the decade following the cohort
year, when the child is heavily dependent on their parent. I find that average
cyclical fluctuations in the economy in which children lived between the ages
of 0 and 18 drive to some extent their average rate of absolute income mobility
through adulthood. This relationship is statistically significant conditional on
middle to relatively high percentile ranks of parent income. This may imply
that middle- to high-income households rely on credit to finance investment in
human capital to an extent that relatively low-income households do not.
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1 Introduction
The American Dream generally requires economic mobility across generations, or
what economists refer to as intergenerational economic mobility. The term intergen-
erational economic mobility generally describes an individual’s opportunity to achieve
a rank in the distribution of income that is independent of the rank the individual’s
parent achieved when the individual was a child. According to Chetty et al. (2014),
intergenerational mobility varies substantially across the U.S. (while it has generally
decreased over time); the authors identify family structure and social capital among
the strongest predictors of intergenerational mobility.
Ideally, the level of an individual’s income depends only on their choices and
actions, independent of family income—past or present—or exogenous forces such
as the neighborhood in which a child is raised (Isaacs, Sawhill, and Haskins 2008).
In practice, this is not the case; exogenous forces have substantial effects on the
income a child generates as an adult. The expected future outcomes for a child born
to a parent whose income ranks in the top quintile of the income distribution of
the parent’s generation is much different than the expected future outcomes for a
child born to a parent whose income ranks in the bottom quintile of the parent’s
income distribution. On average, a child born to a parent whose income ranks in
the top (bottom) quintile of the parent’s income distribution has the greatest chance
to rank in the high (low) end of the income distribution as an adult (Grusky and
Mitnik 2015). Economists attribute a large portion of the difference in these outcomes
to intergenerational elasticity (IGE), which reflects the persistence of the parent’s
income rank; the greater the IGE, the greater the persistence and, thus, the less the
intergenerational mobility.
In Becker and Tomes (1979), the foundational model of intergenerational economic
mobility, the child’s intergenerational mobility depends on family characteristics. The
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parent’s propensity to invest in the human capital of their child and the inheritability
of parental endowments drive intergenerational economic mobility. Building on this
framework, Lee and Seshadri (2019) demonstrate that credit constraints increase IGE
and, thus, decrease intergenerational mobility, by decreasing the amount a parent is
able to invest in the human capital of their child. And, according to the authors,
the timing of human-capital investments is as important as the amount invested:
specifically, investments in early childhood are more productive, in terms of the child’s
mobility, than investments in later childhood. In effect, prevention is more successful
than remediation.
My central hypothesis is that, fundamentally, aggregate economic fluctuations—
business cycles—affect intergenerational mobility because imperfect capital markets
impose countercyclical credit constraints on households. These constraints limit the
amount a parent invests in the human capital of their child, thereby limiting the
foundational skills the child acquires and the expected future income the child earns
as an adult. Essentially, my working hypothesis proposes that the expected income
of an adult child who was raised during a recession could be adversely affected by the
parent’s inability to access the credit necessary to invest fully in the human capital
of the child.
The connection between business cycles and access to credit is not new. A clas-
sic case is the Great Depression, when, according to Bernanke (1983), incomplete
financial markets, made fragile by an adverse aggregate shock, reduced credit inter-
mediation to households, which most depended on bank loans. Bank loans and other
forms of intermediated credit fund investments in human capital. There is strong
support for (but few if any tests of) my central hypothesis, because there is ample
evidence that small differences in investments in the human capital of a child early
in their life matter a great deal to that child’s economic mobility, in part because
the foundational skills the young child acquires drive their expected future earnings
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(Cunha et al. 2006, Cunha and Heckman 2007, Heckman and Mosso 2014, and Lee
and Seshadri 2019).
I show that within the United States, the timing, amplitudes, and durations of
short-run aggregate fluctuations—in gross state product, personal income, or unem-
ployment, for example—instigated by macroeconomic shocks are not uniform across
states. To test my central hypothesis, I exploit this state-level variation in economic
performance. My panel-regression approach pairs a state-level measure of mobility
for one of four child birth cohorts (1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980)—this is my dependent
variable—with an average measure of state-level cyclical economic fluctuations during
the decade following the birth-cohort year. For, example, for the 1950 birth cohort,
one such measure of cyclical economic fluctuations is average cyclical real personal
income from 1950 to 1959, when the age of a child in the 1950 birth cohort is any-
where from 0 (born in 1950) and 18 (born in 1941); this is an age range during which
investments in the human capital of the child are most formative. To my knowledge,
the only comprehensive examination of this general relationship between economic
mobility and the business cycle is Winkelried and Torres (2019) for the case of Peru.
Using a panel of national household survey data (referred to as ENAHO) from 1997
to 2016, the authors conclude economic mobility among households in poverty lags
the business cycle by two years. As the economy enters recession, intergenerational
mobility and entry of new families into poverty decreases; in essence, the authors
conclude that the business cycle drives economic mobility.
Based on average U.S. state-level cyclical fluctuations, I conclude that aggregate
fluctuations drive rates of absolute income mobility, a measure of the fraction of adult
children born to a particular birth cohort who earn more real income than their par-
ents did; this ability for an adult child to achieve a greater standard of living than
their parents did is, according to Chetty et al. (2017, p.1), “one of the defining
features of the American Dream.” Interestingly though, the relationship is statis-
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tically significant in the cases for parental income percentile ranks, 50, 70, 80, and
90, only. Generally speaking, I interpret these results to mean cyclical fluctuations
during childhood drive rates of absolute income mobility conditional on a middle or
relatively high percentile rank of parent income. That these effects pertain to mid-
dle and relatively high-income households is interesting, particularly if, as I argue,
the availability of credit underlies the transmission mechanism from cyclical fluctua-
tions to economic mobility. One possible implication is that middle- to high-income
households rely on credit to finance investments in human capital to an extent that
relatively low-income households do not. In some sense, credit-rationing constrains
only households that can access credit in the first place.
That the business cycle drives the rate of absolute income mobility implies, at the
very least, the importance of macroeconomic stabilization policies in general. And,
given the heterogeneity of state-level economic outcomes that I report (and exploit
to test my working hypothesis), my results also imply a potential role for stabiliza-
tion policies directed at individual states. For example, my results lend credence
to automatic stabilization policies that direct stimulus payments to states based on
state-specific economic outcomes, the sort of mechanism proposed by Claudia Sahm,
for example. Moreover, my results emphasize the importance of access to loanable
funds, particularly for families who rely on credit to further the investment in the
human capital of their children. Broadly speaking, my results suggest that macroe-
conomic stabilization policies not only potentially hasten the pace of macroeconomic
recoveries; such policies also potentially improve rates of absolute income mobility—a
key driver of the American dream.
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2 Literature Review
2.1 Measures of Intergenerational Economic Mobility
The term economic mobility describes how an individual’s income changes over their
lifetime relative to the distribution of incomes earned in the economy. Upward (down-
ward) mobility describes how and to what extent an individual’s income rises (falls)
relative to the distribution of incomes earned in the economy. Generally speaking,
the often-touted American Dream requires economic mobility across generations, or
what economists refer to as intergenerational economic mobility. More precisely, in-
tergenerational economic mobility describes an individual’s opportunity to achieve a
rank in the distribution of incomes earned in the economy that is independent of the
rank the individual’s parent achieved when the individual was a child.
Economists characterize an outcome of intergenerational mobility as either relative
or absolute. Relative intergenerational economic mobility measures an individual’s
rank in the distribution of income relative to the rank of others in the individual’s
generation. Absolute intergenerational economic mobility compares the income of
an adult child to the income their parents earned when the parents were the age of
their adult child. Intergenerational elasticity (IGE) is a standard measure of rela-
tive mobility. IGE describes persistence across generations: the extent to which a
parent’s rank in the distribution of income determines their adult child’s rank in the
distribution of income of the child’s generation (Grusky and Mitnik 2015). Chetty et
al. (2014a) describe the most common empirical measure of IGE as βY in Equation
1, where lnYi is the income the adult child earns at age 30, αY is the average trend
of incomes across generations, lnXi is the income the parent earned at age 30, and
εi is uncorrelated with lnXi.
lnYi = αY + βY lnXi + εi (1)
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According to Equation 1, the IGE coefficient (βY ) measures the share of the
percentage change in the parent’s income that is the percentage change in their child’s
income (Chetty et al. 2014a). Typically, this degree of persistence (βY ) registers
between 0 and 1, where 0 represents complete mobility and 1 represents complete
immobility. More concretely, given βY = 0, a 10 percent rise (fall) in the amount
of income a parent earns is not reflected in the amount of income the adult child
earns. On the other hand, given βY = 1, a 10 percent rise (fall) in the amount of
income a parent earns generates an identical 10 percent rise (fall) in the amount of
income the adult child earns. The interior outcomes are most instructive: suppose,
for example, βY = 0.6; in this case a 10 percent rise (fall) in the amount of income
a parent earns drives a 6 percent rise (fall) in the amount of income the adult child
earns. Thus, a relatively small IGE measure, say βY = 0, implies persistence across
generations is low, resulting in high relative mobility because the outcome of the child
is independent of their parent’s outcome: the income a child earns is not influenced
by the income their parents earned. Similarly, a relatively large IGE measure, say
βY = 1, implies persistence is high, resulting in low relative mobility.
A useful way to think about the IGE measure is to think about βY as either
Equation 2 or 3, where cov and var denote covariance and variance, respectively, and









Equation 3 decomposes βY into inter- and intra-generational components of the
IGE measure, which combines the intergenerational correlation between parental and
adult-child incomes (ρyi,xi) and intragenerational deviations of incomes (σyi , σxi); the
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latter expression reflects income inequality at a moment in time. Changes over time
of intragenerational income inequality imply
σyi
σxi
6= 1. Thus, as Equation 3 implies,
all else equal, intergenerational mobility is strongly correlated with intragenerational
inequality: relatively high mobility is associated with relatively low inequality. This
association is captured by the well-known Great Gatsby curve, which associates the
IGE coefficient with a measure of intergenerational inequality—the Gini coefficient.
The Gini coefficient represents the distribution of income within a generation. For
example, a country where the amount of income earned in the economy is distributed
equally registers a Gini coefficient of 0; on the other hand, a country where the amount
of income earned in the economy is earned by a single individual registers a Gini coef-
ficient of 1. Empirically speaking, the Great Gatsby curve depicts a strongly positive
association between the IGE coefficient and the Gini coefficient, thus implying that
intergenerational mobility is strongly (negatively) correlated with intragenerational
inequality.
In order to separate the correlation between parent and adult-child incomes (ρyi,xi)
from the influence of income inequality between generations (σyi , σxi), Chetty et al.
(2014b) propose an alternative measure of relative mobility they call the rank-rank
slope. This measure correlates the adult child’s rank in their income distribution with
that of their parent’s. The authors first create percentile bins; for each generation,
the authors divide the range of incomes earned in the economy into 100 separate
bins. Based on the amount of income an individual earns, the authors assign each
individual a rank between 1 and 100. Thus, the rank-rank slope measure, βR in
Equation 4, isolates the intergenerational correlation between parental and adult-
child outcomes; as such, the measure is independent of changes in intragenerational
income inequality. In Equation 4, Ri is the percentile rank of adult-child i’s income
in their generation’s distribution of income, Pi is the percentile rank of parent i’s
income in their generation’s distribution of income, and υi is uncorrelated with Pi.
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Ri = αR + βRPi + υi (4)
Thus, percentile ranks are distributed uniformly by construction due to the range
of ranks (1 to 100) being the same for every generation; the standard deviation of adult
child ranks is equal to the standard deviation of parent ranks (
σRi
σPi
= 1; see Equation
3). Therefore, βR measures simply the correlation between an adult child’s income
rank in their income distribution and her parent’s income rank in the parent’s income
distribution (βR = ρR,P ). In this way, this so-called rank-rank slope is independent
of changes over time in intragenerational income inequality.
Moreover, because αR is the expected income rank of adult-child i’s income con-
ditional on parent i’s income rank equal to zero (Pi = 0), βR captures the difference
between the expected income ranks of children born to parents at the top versus the
bottom of the income distribution: βR × 100 = R100i − αR (Chetty et al. 2014b).
Again, the higher the slope coefficient, the lower the relative mobility. In any case,
empirically speaking, increases in income inequality over time tend not to decrease
intergenerational mobility, because much of the increase occurs at the top one per-
cent of the income distribution, where the Gini coefficient and economic mobility are
positively correlated (Chetty et al. 2014b).
A disadvantage to using the IGE measure to gauge improvements in mobility
is that, unlike an absolute-mobility measure, a relative-mobility measure does not
distinguish between improving and worsening income outcomes: increased mobility
could be achieved by worsening outcomes of the rich, for example, in which case,
more mobility is not welfare improving (Chetty et al. 2014b). A common measure
of absolute mobility, which Chetty et al. (2014b) call absolute upward mobility
at percentile rank p, characterizes the adult-child i’s income rank in their income
distribution conditional on parent i’s income rank in their income distribution equal
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to a given percentile rank, p; the authors focus on parents at the 25th percentile of
the income distribution, or so-called upward absolute mobility at percentile 25. In the
context of Equation 4, given estimates of αR and βR, the absolute mobility at, say,
the twenty-fifth percentile, r̄25, is expressed as, r̄25 = αR + βR × 25.
Finally, according to Chetty et al. (2017), one popular way to capture the Ameri-
can Dream is through the rate of absolute income mobility, a measure of the fraction
of adult children born to a particular birth cohort who earn more real income at age
30 than their parents did at age 30. For example, a rate of absolute income mobility
measure of 0.6 implies that 60 percent of children generated (at age 30) more in-
come than their parents generated (at age 30). As the absolute income mobility rate
increases (decreases), more (less) children earn a level of income greater than their
parents earned. Equation 5 specifies the rate of absolute income mobility for children
of birth-cohort c who are born to a parent in percentile p̃ of the income distribution;
ykic denotes the income of child (or kid) i in birth cohort c, y
p
ic denotes the income of













For example, in Figure 1, I illustrate the rate of absolute income mobility for
South Dakota for the children in the 1950 and 1980 birth cohorts conditional on the
parental income percentile rank (measured along the x-axis). The rate of absolute
income mobility trends downward as the parental income percentile rank increases.
And, in general, the fraction of adult children who earn more income than their
parents earned has decreased over time (for South Dakota and the United States
more generally); the rate for the 1980s birth cohort is lower than that of the 1950
birth cohort at almost every parental income percentile rank.
According to Figure 1, a child born in the 1950 birth cohort to a parent in the
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25th percentile of the parent’s income distribution has a rate of absolute income
mobility of about 0.86: this is to say, 86 percent of South Dakota children in the
1950 birth cohort generated (at age 30) more income than their parents generated (at
age 30). The comparable figure for the 1980 birth cohort is about 0.68, or roughly
twenty percent less than the rate associated with the 1950 birth cohort. Meanwhile,
a child born in the 1950 birth cohort to a parent in the 90th percentile has a rate of
absolute income mobility of about 0.70. Thus, the percentage of children who earn
more income than their parent once did decreases as the parental income percentile
rank increases from 1 to 100. In any case, a change in the rate of absolute income
mobility does not necessarily correspond to a change in the child’s rank within their
generation’s income distribution. Although a child’s income may increase relative to
their parent’s income, the child’s rank in their generation’s income distribution may
not change—increase or otherwise—given that other children of the same generation
may also earn more income than their parents earned (Chetty et al. 2017). To test my
central hypothesis, Ap̃,c, the rate of absolute income mobility (illustrated for South
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Dakota in Figure 1), is the ideal measure of intergenerational mobility. Thus, this
measure is my dependent variable in all of my forthcoming regression analyses.
2.2 Patterns of Intergenerational Economic Mobility
All measures of economic mobility, whether relative or absolute in nature, vary be-
tween nations. Typically, the IGE for developed countries is relatively low, indicating
that intergenerational mobility in developed countries is relatively high; so, in terms of
intergenerational mobility, developed countries fair relatively well compared to other
countries. Though intergenerational economic mobility in the United States ranks
low compared to other developed countries. For example, the unconditional IGE in
the U.S. is about 0.5; as such, the U.S. exhibits some of the lowest mobility of devel-
oped countries; in contrast, the unconditional IGE in Canada is about 0.25 (Berger
2018 and Solon 2004). Therefore, compared Canada, in the United States, the out-
comes of a parent affect the outcomes of her child twice as strongly. A parent in
the United States whose income falls by 10 percent expects her child’s income to fall
by 5 percent; whereas a parent in Canada whose income falls by 10 percent expects
her child’s income to fall by 2.5 percent. Meanwhile, some developed countries have
an IGE measure of less than 0.2; examples include Denmark, Finland, and Norway
(Corak 2013).
In order to explain the variation of intergenerational mobility across countries,
Solon (2004) models a steady-state IGE, through optimizing behavior of families,
in terms of inheritability of income-related traits, the marginal product of parent’s
investments in the human capital of children, the earnings return to the stock of
human capital, and the level of public investment in human capital. The author does
this by modeling changes in IGE across countries after a shock to either the return to
human capital investment or the level of public investment. According to the author,
a country with low (high) intergenerational mobility, and, so, high (low) IGE, exhibits
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strong (weak) inheritability, high (low) marginal product of investment, high (low)
returns to the stock of human capital, or a less (more) progressive system of public
investment, all of which increase (decrease) intergenerational income persistence.
Across countries, differences in intergenerational mobility is correlated with in-
equality. This correlation exemplifies the Great Gatsby curve, the association be-
tween the IGE coefficient and the Gini coefficient. Corak (2013) illustrates the curve
for several countries, for which the association is strongly positive: the more inequal-
ity of economic outcomes, the greater the IGE (which translates to lower mobility).
Within the United States, increases in income inequality across time do not decrease
intergenerational mobility in the ways economists generally expect. This is likely
because, in the United States, increases in inequality typically happen in the top 1
percent of the income distribution (Chetty et al. 2014a). According to Chetty et
al. (2014b), the relationship between the Gini coefficient for the bottom 99 percent
(calculated by taking out the top 1 percent of wage earners) and upward economic
mobility is negative. For the bottom 99 percent, an increase in income inequality of
one percentage point causes upward economic mobility to decrease by approximately
0.63 percentage points. However, for the top 1 percent, an increase in income in-
equality of one percentage point causes upward economic mobility to increase by 0.1
percentage points. Thus, the top 1 percent of the income distribution distorts the
Great Gatsby effects that economists generally expect.
The extent of income inequality in the United States between the top 1 percent
and the bottom 99 percent of income earners emphasizes the vastly different outcomes
across the parent’s income distribution. In the United States, relative and absolute
intergenerational economic mobility vary greatly conditional on the rank of the par-
ent in their income distribution. This conditional variation leads to very different
standards of living for children born to families at opposite ends of percentile ranks
in the income distribution. Based on tax and other administrative data, Grusky
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and Mitnik (2015) conclude that children born to parents who rank in the top per-
centiles experience outcomes that are much different than the outcomes experienced
by children born to parents who rank in the bottom percentiles. Unconditional on
where a parent ranks in her generation’s income distribution, the IGE registers about
0.5; thus, a one percent increase in a parent’s income increases their child’s income
(earned as an adult) by about 0.5 percent. However, a one percent increase in the
income of a parent whose income ranks between the 50th and 90th percentiles of their
generation’s income distribution yields about a 0.65 percent increase in the income of
their child; the comparable IGE for a parent whose income ranks between the 10th
and 50th percentiles of their generation’s income distribution is about 0.4 (Grusky
and Mitnik 2015). Therefore, a given increase in the amount of income earned by
parents is most beneficial to the children whose parents rank relatively high in their
income distribution.
Differences of the IGE measure, conditional on the parental percentile rank, are
also present in other countries. The relationship between the earnings of fathers and
sons in select Nordic countries—namely, Denmark, Norway, and Finland—conditional
on the income percentile rank of the parent differs greatly from the corresponding re-
lationships for the United States and the United Kingdom. Bratsberg et al. (2007)
regress the log incomes of sons on the log incomes of fathers. The resulting rela-
tionship is strongly linear based on data for the UK and US.; however, the resulting
relationship is convex based on data for these Nordic countries. In order to better
understand the IGE within the Nordic countries, the authors report IGEs for these
countries and the United States for the 10th, 50th, and 90th parental percentile ranks.
For Denmark, the authors report an IGE measure of 0.063 at the 10th percentile
and 0.312 at the 90th percentile, suggesting a low-income-earning father does not
adversely affect his child’s earning potential, while a high-income-earning father af-
fects his child’s earning potential to some degree. For the United States, on the other
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hand, the authors report an IGE of 0.489 at the 10th percentile and 0.646 at the
90th percentile, suggesting a low-income-earning father has a relatively large (ad-
verse) effect on his child’s earning potential. The authors attribute these differences
in intergenerational mobility to difference in educational policy. Generally, Nordic
countries redistribute more resources to poor community schools in order to help ev-
ery child reach a minimum learning standard across the entire country and offset the
educational disadvantages experienced by students whose parents rank relatively low
in the income distribution (Bratsberg et al. 2007).
Chetty et al. (2017) demonstrate the variation of absolute mobility conditional on
the parent’s rank in their income distribution using a transition matrix; the authors
focus on the United States. The authors divide the income of the 1984 birth cohort,
the most recent cohort at the time the study was published, into percentile bins and
find the percentage chance a child falls into a specific percentile rank conditional on
the percentile rank of the parent. A child born to a parent who ranks relatively high in
their income distribution has a relatively good chance to rank high (as an adult child)
in their income distribution. Specifically, a child born to a parent who ranks in the
10th percentile has a 28 percent chance of reaching a percentile rank of 50 or higher;
a child born to a parent in the 50th percentile has a 52 percent chance of reaching a
percentile rank of 50 or higher; and a child born to a parent in the 90th percentile has
a 70 percent chance of reaching a percentile rank of 50 or higher. Clearly, the rank of
a parent can create large differences in outcomes for children. By simulating a more
equal distribution of income growth, the authors significantly reduce the decline in
intergenerational mobility throughout the United States, suggesting that economic
growth must be shared more equally across the income distribution in order to raise
absolute mobility.
On average, economic growth necessarily raises household income and, thus, up-
ward mobility measured as the percentage of children whose level of family income
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is higher than that of her parent’s (Issacs, Sawhill, and Haskins 2008). This type of
measure of intergenerational mobility—the rate of absolute income mobility specified
by Equation 5 is one such example—uses actual, inflation-adjusted dollar amounts,
which, generally speaking, economic growth strongly affects. Economic growth is
often thought of as a rising tide; as the water level, or economic activity in this
case, increases, it lifts all boats, or personal incomes in this case, equally. Equally
distributed economic growth would increase the incomes of all adult children, inde-
pendent of parental percentile rank; thus, equally distributed economic growth would
not change the rank of each child in their income distribution. Nevertheless, economic
growth would increase the rate of absolute upward mobility for all children, because
each would earn more than their parents earned.
Practically speaking, in the United States, the positive effect that economic growth
has on upward mobility has decreased because the growth is increasingly shared
unequally. To show the difference in income growth across the income distribution,
Isaacs, Sawhill, and Haskins (2008) divide the income distribution into quintiles and
measure the median income of each quintile for both the parent’s generation, averaged
between 1967 and 1971, and the children’s generation, averaged between 1995 and
2002. In recent years, households that earn incomes that rank in the upper fifth of
the income distribution have experienced the majority of household-income growth.
Specifically, the median income of the top quintile increased by 52 percent from
the parents’ generation to the children’s generation, while the median income of the
bottom quintile increased by only 18 percent (Isaacs, Sawhill, and Haskins 2008). In
this case, a child born to a parent who ranks in the top quintile will experience a
stronger tide, raising their income more than the income of a child born to a parent
who ranks in the bottom quintile. This finding is similar to that of the Congressional
Budget Office, which reports a 69 percent increase in after-tax income for the top
quintile compared to a 6 percent increase in after-tax income for the bottom quintile.
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A child born to a parent in the bottom quintile experiences less income growth over
the child’s lifetime than a child born to a parent in the top quintile experiences.
Regardless of the variation of intergenerational mobility across the income distri-
bution, IGE has increased—and, correspondingly, relative intergenerational economic
mobility has decreased—over time. Aaronson and Mazumder (2008) demonstrate this
pattern for the United States using decennial census data to create synthetic father-
son pairs. The authors find that the IGE increased sharply between 1980, when the
IGE registered 0.31, and 2000, when the IGE registered 0.57. This rather large in-
crease in IGE after 1980 translates into greater intergenerational earnings persistence
across families; the effects from the change in the income a parent earns affects mul-
tiple future generations and it takes longer for each generation to regress towards the
average income of each generation’s income distribution (Aaronson and Mazumder
2008). An adult child in 1980 (from the 1950 birth cohort) experiences 30 percent
of his father’s deviation from the mean income of his income distribution; whereas
an adult child in 2000 (from the 1970 birth cohort) experiences half of his father’s
deviation from the mean income of his income distribution. More concretely, if a
father’s income rose (fell) by 10 percent, his child’s expected income at age 30 in 1980
rose (fell) by 3.1 percent; the corresponding rise (fall) in a child’s expected income at
age 30 in 2000 was 5.7 percent. Therefore, intergenerational persistence has increased
over time, creating less economically mobile circumstances.
Absolute economic mobility has decreased over time as well. Based on de-identified
tax records, Chetty et al. (2017) report that the rate of absolute income mobility (ex-
pressed by Equation 5) has trended downward, implying that the fraction of children
whose level of income is higher than that of her parent’s has decreased, independent
of parental percentile rank; put differently, the sort of curve illustrated in Figure 1
has generally shifted downward over time across the United States. The decline in
the rate of absolute income mobility is evident across various subgroups including,
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for example, parental percentile rank, gender, and state. The most drastic fall has
occurred for children born into families whose income ranks in the middle of the in-
come distribution. In the case of gender, the percentage of daughters earning more
than their fathers fell from 43 percent in 1940 to 26 percent in 1984; meanwhile, the
percentage of sons earning more than their fathers fell from 95 percent in 1940 to 41
percent in 1984. Though, to be sure, the number of daughters who worked in 1940
was lower than in 1984, and this pattern makes the fall in the rate of absolute mobility
for daughters larger than otherwise. In the case of states, Michigan experienced the
largest fall in the percentage of children earning more than their parents, falling by
48 percent between 1940 and 1980; the experience in Michigan is followed closely by a
45-percent fall in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio. The smallest fall of 35 percent occurred
in Massachusetts, New York, and Montana. Based on a counterfactual simulation
in which individuals in each income rank share economic growth (between 1940 and
1980) equally, the authors estimate a national-level rate of absolute income mobility
of 62 percent, which is 12 percent more than the actual value. Therefore, the au-
thors attribute much of this widespread decline in absolute mobility to the unequal
distribution of economic growth (Chetty et al. 2017).
Intergenerational mobility varies across regions of the United States at any point
in time as well. For example, some states within the nation consistently experience
lower mobility than other states (Berger 2018). States within the Great Plains region
consistently experience the highest intergenerational mobility, while states in the
Southeast region consistently experience the lowest intergenerational mobility (Chetty
et al. 2014b). Indeed, this interstate variability is quite large: intergenerational
mobilities in states such as Utah, Idaho, and Wyoming are as high as that in Canada
and other countries in which mobility is high; meanwhile, mobilities in states such as
Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama are as low as that in developing countries where
mobilities are typically quite low (Chetty et al. 2014b).
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Moreover, the variation in intergenerational mobility occurs intrastate. Chetty
et al. (2014b) divide states into commuting zones, which typically include multi-
ple counties and are determined by population. For example, the state of Michigan
includes 83 counties, 533 cities, and 18 commuting zones. The authors find intergen-
erational mobility varies across commuting zones. For example, mobility (measured
as IGE) in Mississippi varies between 0.51 in the Yazoo City, MS commuting zone
and 0.34 in the Gulfport, MS commuting zone; likewise, mobility varies between 0.46
in the Devils Lake, ND commuting zone and 0.07 in the Linton, ND commuting zone.
According to Chetty et al. (2014b) and Sharkey and Torrats-Espinosa (2017), race,
segregation, crime, income levels, inequality, school quality, social capital, and family
structure explain much of this variability. For example, all else equal, a child who
lives in a neighborhood when it experiences a fall in violent crime achieves (as an
adult) an expected income rank that is higher than otherwise (Sharkey and Torrats-
Espinosa 2017); these results are based on FBI Uniform Crime Reports that specify
the areas and severities of crimes throughout the country. According to the authors,
the frequency and severity of violent crime in a county decrease the average mobil-
ity of children raised there, because increases in violent crimes increase high-school
dropout rates (Sharkey and Torrats-Espinosa 2017). Meanwhile, according to Kotera
and Seshadri (2017), who model the accumulation of human capital of a child as a
function of public spending on schools and private spending on children by parents,
when public school spending is primarily distributed toward districts whose residents
rank relatively high in the income distribution, intergenerational mobility in that area
is low (Kotera and Seshadri 2017).
Finally, an important and timely variable that explains some of the variation in
intergenerational mobility across regions of the United States is the historical pattern
of racial segregation. Andrews et al. (2017) determine that racial segregation in 1880
is negatively related to mobility for adult children, age 30, during the 2010s across
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the states. The authors specify the relationship between past racial segregation,
measured as the rate of each race of the head of households within neighborhoods, and
economic mobility of children who become wage-earning adults in the 2010s. IPUMS
provides information on neighborhood segregation gathered from the US Census.
Intergenerational mobility in commuting zones that experienced a higher pattern of
racial segregation in the past is consistently lower; specifically, a 1 percent increase
in neighborhood segregation in 1880 results in a 0.06 increase in IGE and, thus, a
decrease in intergenerational mobility (Andrews et al. 2017).
2.3 Models of Intergenerational Economic Mobility
The patterns of economic mobility across countries, regions, and time, sparks an in-
triguing question of how precisely the income that parents earn influences the income
that their children earn. Generally, economists attribute this intergenerational rela-
tionship to the amount a parent invests in the human capital of their child. Becker
and Tomes (1979) model the transmission of income inequality across multiple gen-
erations of a single family. In this model, the authors demonstrate how the utility
of each generation depends on their own consumption as well as the income of the
next generation. Parents increase the income of their children (and, therefore, the
utility of the parents) by investing in their children’s human capital or endowing
their children with income-earning traits, including culture for example; market luck
and endowment luck play (non-systematic) roles as well. Meanwhile, capital markets
function perfectly.
Becker and Tomes (1986) expand on this utility maximizing model to understand
the role capital markets play in driving intergenerational mobility. In perfect capital
markets, families from every income level are able to maximize their investment in the
human capital of their children through borrowing and without decreasing their own
consumption. The amount a parent borrows in order to maximize their investment
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depends on their income. A parent with less disposable income borrows more than a
parent with more disposable income. Therefore, the former passes on a larger amount
of debt to their child than does the latter; this additional debt burden decreases the
future economic welfare of children from families lower in the income distribution.
In imperfect capital markets, parents at the bottom of the income distribution must
decide between consumption and investment. Binding credit constraints raise the
cost of borrowing and lower the parent’s investment in human capital and, thus, the
adult earnings of her child, effectively reducing intergenerational mobility. I return
to this model in Section 3.
At what stage of the child’s life the parent invests in the human capital of the child
matters. Cunha and Heckman (2007) model self productivity, or how skills produced
at a young age compound over time. When a parent invests in the human capital of
her child early in the child’s life, the investment builds a cognitive foundation on which
future human capital investments can take root. In this model, if the parent under
invests early on, the child’s skill set is forever less than it would have been otherwise.
In order to demonstrate this compounding nature of investments in the creation of
skills, Cunha et al. (2006) model human capital accumulation as the result of a
continuous stream of investments from parent to child and the marginal productivity
of each investment, or skills multiplier. Based on this model, the authors demonstrate
the importance of timing: the ratio of early to late-stage human-capital investments
is positively related to the skills multiplier (Cunha et al. 2006). Because relatively
young children tend to have relatively young parents, and because relatively young
parents often face life-cycle borrowing constraints that prevent them from investing
in the human capital of their child, these borrowing constraints could significantly
affect a child’s ability to earn relatively high income as an adult.
Finally, if borrowing constraints bind, parental skill may matter as well. Accord-
ing to Heckman and Mosso (2014), if the parent’s ability to borrow in order to invest
21
early in the life of their child depends on the parent’s skill set, a relatively highly
skilled parent is able to borrow relatively more and therefore invest relatively more in
the human capital of their child. Thus, the skill set of the parent produces intergen-
erational effects, because a parent with a relatively large skill set effectively produces
a child with a relatively large skill set; and the ability to earn income is positively
related to size of an income-earner’s skill set.
To be sure, this often-modeled relationship between borrowing constraints and
intergenerational mobility is potentially very strong. Lee and Seshadri (2019) model
human capital investment over various stages of childhood while accounting for the
stock of skills a child collects throughout his life. The authors demonstrate that small
differences in investment in the human capital of children early in life matter a great
deal. The authors attribute about one third of IGE to younger parents, who tend to
experience borrowing constraints that are tighter than those that older parents expe-
rience. According to the authors, relaxing the life cycle budget constraint—loosening
the borrowing constraints of young parents—reduces intergenerational persistence
and thus, increases intergenerational mobility. As the borrowing constraint on young
parents loosens, they are able to invest more in the human capital of their child,
decoupling the link between the amount of income the parent earns from the amount
of income the adult child earns. The authors also model government intervention and
education subsidies directed to the earliest period of children’s lives. The redirection
of subsides in this way decreases the IGE significantly, from 0.3 to 0.1. Education
subsidies in the earliest period of childhood assists young parents who face borrow-
ing constraints, causing positive long run outcomes; the average human capital stock




In Section 3.1, I link intergenerational elasticity to credit constraints in order to
establish the channel through which tightening credit constraints affect the future
economic welfare of children. The model illustrates how the amount a parent in-
vests in the human capital of their child determines their future economic success,
and so too their intergenerational mobility. Specifically, tightening credit constraints
decrease the amount a parent is able to invest in the human capital of their child,
resulting in a decrease in the expected future economic welfare of the child. In Sec-
tion 3.2, I link aggregate fluctuations to credit constraints to demonstrate in what
way aggregate shocks cause the supply of credit to decrease. Using these models, I
show that through credit channels, aggregate fluctuations affect the amount a parent
invests in the human capital of their child; and, as such, aggregate fluctuations have
implications for intergenerational economic mobility.
3.1 Becker and Tomes: Intergenerational Elasticity and Credit Constraints
According to the extant literature, the income an adult child earns depends on the
income their parents earned. A canonical class of models of mobility associate it with
intergenerational investments in human capital, inheritances of family endowments,
and market and endowed luck, neither of which the parent or child determines. In
order to model precisely a transmission of income from a parent to a child, and the
role that imperfect credit markets play in this transmission process, I begin with
Becker and Tomes (1979). In this model of multiple generations of a single family,
the utility of each generation depends on their consumption and the income of the
next generation. The model assumes perfect capital markets—an assumption I relax
going forward—and, thus, borrowing constraints do not bind.
Becker and Tomes (1979) propose a utility maximizing model in which parents
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maximize their children’s future economic welfare, or adult net earnings—the dif-
ference between all inflows of income and outflows of debt service. In this model,
parental earnings are potentially transferred to children in two ways: endowments in
the form of risk-free assets and expenditures in investments in the human capital of
the child. The parent’s utility function at time t, Ut, is specified in Equation 6, where
Zt is the consumption of the parent in period t and It+1 is the (aggregate) wealth of
the child.
Ut = Ut (Zt, It+1) (6)
The parent maximizes Equation 6 subject to the budget constraint specified in
Equation 7, where rt is the rate of return (per generation) on investment in children,
et+1 is the realization (in period t + 1) of the endowment, ut+1 is the realization of
market luck, and wt+1 is the value to children of each unit of the endowment and
market luck; following Becker and Tomes (1979), I denote the right-hand side of









1 + rt︸ ︷︷ ︸
St
(7)
The parent satisfies first-order conditions, setting the marginal rate of substitution—
the rate at which the parent can decrease their consumption in order to increase in-
vestment without decreasing their utility—equal to the (inter-temporal) gross rate of






= 1 + rt (8)
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Becker and Tomes (1979) assume Equation 6 is homothetic and, thus, homogenous
of degree 1: utility depends only on the ratio of two goods. I assume the monotonic
transformation holds in order to solve the problem analytically. Accordingly, I assume
Equation 6 takes the constant relative risk aversion, CRRA, form of Equation 9,
where θ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and γ measures the parent’s relative








I solve the model under certainty. Thus, I assume the parent correctly anticipates,
in period t, the realizations of the endowment (et+1) and market luck (ut+1); doing
















Zt = (1− α)St (11)
In Equation 10, the slope parameter—based in this case on CRRA utility (Equa-
tion 9)—is the specific functional form of the term, α (γ, 1 + rt), to which Becker
and Tomes (1979) refer.1 Not surprisingly, investment in children is increasing in
the relative preference for the wealth of children: ∂α(γ,1+rt)
∂γ
> 0; whereas the sign
of ∂α(γ,1+rt)
∂rt
depends on the magnitude of θ relative to 1: if θ < 1, the substitution
effect dominates and ∂α(γ,1+rt)
∂rt




1See, for example, Equation 8 on page 1157 of Becker and Tomes (1979).
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Substituting in Equation 10 for the definition of St specified in Equation 7 yields
Equation 12, where, following Becker and Tomes (1979), I denote α (1 + rt) as βt—the
parent’s propensity to invest in her children.
It+1 = α (1 + rt)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βt
It + αwt+1et+1 + αwt+1ut+1 (12)
Therefore, the aggregate wealth of children, It+1, is not only dependent on the
inclination of their parents to invest, βt, and the aggregate wealth of their parent, It,
but also on the realization of the endowment, et+1. Becker and Tomes (1979) propose
the (child’s) endowment-generating equation specified in Equation 13, where h is the
share of the parent’s endowment, et, that the child inherits from the parent, ēt is the
average endowment of generation t, f is the (generational) growth rate of ēt, and υt+1
is the difference between the actual and the expected endowment.
et+1 = (1− h+ f) ēt + het + υt+1 (13)
According to Becker and Tomes (1979, 1159), the term (1− h+ f) ēt “is a simple
way of incorporating the influence of the ‘culture’ or ‘social capital’ of other families.”
The influence from these additional sources is relevant to understanding how It+1 is
formed. Combining Equations 12 and 13 by eliminating et+1 yields Equation 14.
It+1 = αwt+1 (1− h+ f) ēt+βtIt+αhwt+1et+αwt+1υt+1+αwt+1ut+1 (14)
Based on the assumption that the parameters in the model and the average en-
dowment (ēt) are stationary (and, so, the statistical properties such as mean and the
variance are constant over time), Becker and Tomes (1979) set (rt, wt) = (1, 1) and
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f = 0 in Equation 14; doing so yields Equation 15, which specifies the income of the
child of generation i, where a = (1− h) ē.









Finally, combining Equations 12 and 15 by eliminating endowments, e, yields, by
lagging Equation 12 by one period, Equation 16, where u∗it+i = u
i
t+1 − huit + υit+1.
I it+1 = αē (1− h) + (β + h) I it − βhI it−1 + αu∗it+i (16)
Equation 16 depicts how the income of a parent functionally affects the income
of an adult child. To learn how these parameters, most notably β and h, affect
income, I use the model to specify the IGE. In large samples, this IGE measure
obtains by regressing the log of child income on the log of parent income (see, for
example, Equation 1); in the probability limit, the resulting regression slope coefficient
measures the IGE, as specified in Equation 17.
IGE
p→ Cov (log It, log It+1)
V ar (log It)
(17)
Writing Equation 17 as Equation 18 and assuming a stationary (long-run) equi-


















Thus, as β, h → 0 and, thus, as the parent’s propensity to invest in her child
(β) and the share of the parent’s endowment passed to her child (h) approach zero
(one), IGE approaches zero (one): intergenerational mobility increases (decreases).
Therefore, when the parent is less inclined to invest a share of their income in the
human capital of their child and when the share of endowments passed from parent
to child is low, intergenerational persistence is low and the income of a child becomes
less dependent on the income of their parent—thus, intergenerational mobility is high.
Additionally, a product of the Becker and Tomes (1979) model implies a genera-
tional persistence term, gm, which is a function of β and h and which describes the
change in the income of the m-th generation household to a (compensated) change in
the income of generation-0. In other words, gm indicates the number of generations
it takes for household income to regress back to the mean after a one-unit shock to
the income of the generation-0 household. I specify gm in Equation 20 (for the case
where β 6= h). And in Figure 2, I illustrate three examples of gm based on values I





Evaluated together, gm (Equation 20) and the IGE measure (Equation 19) offer
a useful intuitive framework for interpreting intergenerational mobility: as β, h →
0, gm, IGE → 0; and, as β, h → 1, gm → ∞ and IGE → 1. For example, in
the case of low persistence (β = .30, h = 0.10, IGE = 0.39), the effect on household
income of a one-unit increase in the income of the generation-0 household—the parent
in this example—decays relatively quickly; the effect fades away in roughly seven
generations. Whereas in the case of high persistence (β = .90, h = 0.80, IGE = 0.98),
the effect of a one-unit increase in the income of the parent on the time path of
income across generations decays relatively slowly; some portion of the effect remains
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Figure 2: Intergenerational Time Paths of Income




































 = .30, h = .10, IGE = .39
 = .70, h = .50, IGE = .89
 = .90, h = .80, IGE = .98
fifty generations after the initial income shock for this case: the outcome of a child
replicates her parent’s almost completely and, so, the child is almost completely
immobile. Thus, the effect of an increase (or decrease) in income on intergenerational
persistence is strengthened by β and h.
In any case, Becker and Tomes (1979) assume perfect capital markets; household
credit constraints do not bind. Generally speaking, credit constraints reduce a par-
ent’s propensity to invest in her child; thus, credit constraints effectively increase
IGE. Becker and Tomes (1986) demonstrate this general relationship between imper-
fect capital markets and intergenerational mobility in a two-period model. I briefly
reproduce the essential features of the model based on a version of it that Lee and
Seshadri (2019) propose. In this version, a parent maximizes Equation 21, where c
is consumption of the parent, θ̄ is her degree of altruism towards her child, c′ is the
consumption of her child, and u(·) is CRRA.
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max{u(c) + θ̄u′(c′)} (21)
The parent is subject to the budget constraints that I specify in Equations 22
and 23, where h is the parent’s lifetime earnings, x is the parent’s investment in the
human capital of her child (h′), (1 + r) is the gross interest rate on the investment,
τ is a flat-tax rate used to fund a lump-sum transfer (d̄) that the government invests
in the human capital of the child, and s and s′ are intergenerational transfers from




= (1− τ)(h− x) + s and c′ = (1− τ)h′ + s′ (22)
h′ = ζ̄a′(x+ d̄)γ̄ and s′ ≥ 0 (23)
Therefore, the parent’s disposable income takes the form of (1 − τ)h + s. Her
disposable income is partially consumed, c, and partially transferred to her child,
s′. The production of human capital of the child (Equation 23) is a function of
productivity (ζ̄) and the learning ability of the child (a′); returns to the production
of human capital are diminishing (δ̄ < 1). To solve the model, I assume u(c) = log c,
which yields Equation 24.
max{log c+ θ̄ log c′} (24)
To determine the choice variables c and x, the household satisfies the first-order

















If the credit constraint does not bind (s > 0), Equation 25 holds with equality;
the marginal rate of substitution of investment in the human capital of the child, x,








In order to create the production of the human capital of the child as a function of
the optimal lump-sum investment choice of the parent, I combine Equations 23 and

















As the last step, I take the covariance of both sides of 28 with log h. Doing so
yields Equation 30, the IGE in terms of ρa.
IGEs>0





Therefore, IGE is equal to the persistence of abilities, which is similar to the
inheritability of endowments, h, in Becker and Tomes (1979).
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On the other hand, if the credit constraint does bind (s = 0), Equation 26 yields
Equation 31.
ζ̄a′(x+ d̄)γ̄/(h− x) = γ̄θ̄ζ̄a′/(x+ d̄)1−γ̄ (31)
Thus, x∗ is specified in Equation 32 where π̄ is the fraction of a parent’s earnings





Combining Equations 23 and 32 by eliminating x and taking logs yields Equation
33.
log h′ = [log ζ̄ + γ̄ log(
θ̄(1 + πd)
1 + θ̄γ̄
)] + γ̄ log h+ log a′ (33)
I subtract ρa log h from both sides. Additionally, I assume a long-run stationary
equilibrium. Doing so yields Equation 34, where B is a constant and h−1 is the human
capital of the grandparent.
log h′ = B + (ρa + γ̄) log h− ρaγ̄ log h−1 + η (34)
I derive the IGE for the case of a binding credit constraint by taking the covariance
of both sides of 34 with log h. Doing so yields Equation 36.
IGEs=0








The parameters in this model are functionally similar to β and h in the Becker
and Tomes (1979) model: like β, γ reflects the amount the parent invests in her child;
and like h, ρ reflects the persistence of inheritances or abilities. As ρ, γ → 0, IGE
→ 0; and, as ρ, γ → 1, IGE → 1. And, most importantly for my purposes in this
thesis, IGEs=0 > IGEs>0: credit constraints increase the IGE and, thus, decrease
mobility.
3.2 Bernanke and Gertler: Aggregate Shocks and Credit Constraints
Credit rationing imposes credit constraints. Such rationing occurs when the demand
for loanable funds is greater than the supply of loanable funds and information is
incomplete and, thus, financial markets are imperfect (see for example, Akerlof 1970
and Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). A typical example of how credit rationing works includes
a bank and a potential borrower. The bank considers a borrower to be high risk when
the chance the borrower pays back the loan in full is low. Because the bank could lose
income by making the loan, the bank prefers to lend instead to a low-risk borrower
who is more likely to pay the loan back in full. Unfortunately, the bank cannot
observe the riskiness of the borrower because information is asymmetric: the bank
does not know whether a borrower is high or low risk.
If the bank charges a relatively high interest rate to all borrowers in order to
compensate it for the risks it cannot observe, the bank unintentionally discourages
low-risk borrowers, leaving mostly high-risk borrowers in the market for loans. Know-
ing this, the bank instead rations credit, effectively setting the interest rate below the
market-clearing interest rate. Consequently, the demand for loanable funds exceeds
the supply. Some borrowers receive loans while others, though apparently identical
in terms of creditworthiness to those who receive loans, do not, no matter whether
these excluded borrowers are willing to pay a higher (market-clearing) interest rate
(Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Thus, asymmetric-information problems impose so-called
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agency costs on the economy, where outcomes are second best to those in a world of
perfect (symmetric) information.
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) reason that when an economy experiences a reces-
sion and, likely, a rise in asymmetric information, agency costs increase, heightening
credit rationing and, ultimately, deepening the negative impacts experienced by the
economy. Put differently, agency costs and the credit rationing associated with such
costs are counter cyclical (Azariadis and Smith 1998). Indeed, according to Bernanke
(1983), this pattern—a fall in intermediated credit to households caused by an adverse
aggregate shock—made already-incomplete financial markets fragile during the Great
Depression. Informational asymmetries caused intermediaries to ration credit, which
led to a further contraction of the banking system. Due to the dramatic decrease
in the amount and substantial increase in the price of loans, it became difficult for
individuals dependent on loans, namely households, to secure them.
To demonstrate this relationship between aggregate shocks and credit rationing,
Bernanke and Gertler (1989) propose a real business cycle overlapping-generations
model in which aggregate economic shocks—the sort that propagate business cycles—
buffer the economy’s production function. In effect, a negative (positive) shock de-
creases (increases) internal-financing capacity—net worth in, say, the form of savings—
and, in doing so, increases (decreases) agency costs. In this model, every borrower
has an investment project of which only they costlessly know the outcome. Others,
namely lenders, must incur a cost, γ, to know the outcome of a project; thus, agency
problems require costly state verification.
A borrower is characterized by their efficiency, ω, which ranges between 0 and
1; a relatively efficient borrower uses fewer resources to invest in their project and
therefore the borrower is characterized by a low ω. Equation 37 specifies the supply of
loanable funds in an economy with perfect information, γ = 0, where q̂t+1 denotes the
expected price of capital, kt+1 denotes next period’s capital stock, κ is the possible
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outcome of a project, r denotes the marginal rate of return, and x is a function of ω
and denotes project inputs for a borrower with efficiency ω.
q̂t+1 = rx(kt+1/κη)/κ (37)
When the expected price of capital (q̂t+1) increases, individuals decrease their con-
sumption and increase saving; capital formation and, thus, kt+1 increases. Equation
38 specifies the demand loanable funds, where the expected price of capital equals the
expected marginal product of capital, f ′(kt+1), times a random aggregate productivity
shock, θ, which is the source of aggregate fluctuations in the model.
q̂t+1 = θf
′(kt+1) (38)
The price and amount of capital for the next period are determined by the inter-
section of the supply curve (Equation 37) and the demand curve (Equation 38). In
an economy with perfect information, q̂ and k are constant. In Figure 3, I illustrate
this equilibrium outcome. The perfect-information outcome depicted in Figure 3, in
which a constant (steady-state) level of investment prevails over time, establishes a
benchmark example against which to compare the effects from an aggregate shock in
the imperfect-information case.
In an economy with imperfect information, γ > 0, Bernanke and Gertler (1989)
propose that the outcome of each project will either be a bad outcome, κ1, or a
good outcome, κ2. The probability of each outcome is π1 and π2 respectively, where
π2 = 1 − π1. The project of each individual requires inputs that exceed his savings,
x(ω) > Se, therefore, he borrows the difference, B = x(ω)−Se. The individual seeks
to maximize his next period consumption and borrows to invest in a project in order
to do so. The borrower knows the outcome of his project and the lender does not.
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Figure 3: Capital market with Perfect information (γ = 0)
Therefore, the lender identifies the expected agency costs, which are determined by
the likelihood a project fails and whether or not the lender spends γ to learn the
outcome of the project.
In the model, expected agency costs increase as savings decrease. Therefore, an
adverse shock that decreases net worth causes the agency costs of intermediation
to increase. The increase in agency costs increases the amount of return a lender
requires, which decreases the efficiency (ω) of the pool of borrowers. A large number
of borrowers with a higher ω (less efficient) discourage the lender, who expects to
earn less due to a more risky pool of lenders; this outcome decreases the amount of
credit the lenders provide. The level of investment falls, which further perpetuates
the negative effects of the aggregate shock. Thus, the adverse aggregate shock causes
savings to decrease, shifting the supply curve of loanable funds to the left. In Figure
4, I illustrate the perfect information (γ = 0) supply curve, SS, with the imperfect
information (γ > 0) supply curve, S’S’, and the demand curve, which is unaffected
by imperfect information.
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Figure 4: Capital market with imperfect information (γ > 0)
Figure 4 demonstrates the reduction in supply by the shift from SS to S’S’ due to
imperfect information. Ultimately, in the case of imperfect information, a low level
of savings increases agency costs and leads to a decrease in the number of profitable
projects, causing SS to shift left to S’S’ and decreasing the equilibrium capital stock.
In summary, in this model, an adverse aggregate shock decreases net worth, caus-
ing the agency costs of intermediation to increase and lowering the level of investment
as credit constraints imposed on credit-rationed borrowers tighten. Based on the mod-
els I present in this chapter, I reason that variation in credit constraints caused by
aggregate economic shocks experienced differently across states (something I demon-
strate in Chapter 4) contribute meaningfully to the variation in intergenerational
mobility that we observe across states. Essentially, an aggregate shock affects the
amount a parent can invest in the human capital of their child, which, in turn, affects
the economic mobility of that child.
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4 Heterogenous State-Level Economic Behavior
By definition, an aggregate economic shock affects everyone—and, so, every state—
in the economy. Nevertheless, in this section, I demonstrate that at any moment in
time, shocks to the United States economy affect states differently. Economists often
measure economic fluctuations, or business cycles, at the national level using macroe-
conomic variables such as real gross domestic product (GDP), the unemployment rate,
and real personal income. Generally speaking, a business cycle is an irregular and
unpredictable short-run aggregate economic fluctuation; the phases of the business
cycle include peak, recession, trough, and expansion.
The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) defines a recession as a sig-
nificant decrease in economic activity across the nation that persists for multiple
months. Business cycles in the United States are well specified by the NBER, which
publishes nationally recognized business cycle dates. On the other hand, business
cycles of individual states within the United States are not well specified; we lack a
nationally recognized measure of state-level business cycles, which can differ markedly
from the national business cycle. The timing, amplitudes, and durations of a business
cycle—an ostensibly macroeconomic feature instigated by aggregate shocks—are not
uniform across states (or, in all likelihood, regions within a state). So, while the
effects of aggregate shocks to the economy are typically studied at the national level,
the effects of such shocks are in fact felt quite differently across the fifty states. At
best, the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis groups states into economic regions that
experience similar economic activities. Relatively few studies examine—and, so, shed
light on—heterogenous state-level economic behavior.
Crone (2005) finds that within each of the eight BEA-determined regions, each
of which include multiple states grouped together based on socioeconomic outcomes,
state-level business cycles differ. In order to find state-level cyclicality, the author de-
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trends a state-level coincident index, which consists of 3 monthly state-level variables,
and compares the cyclical component of each state to the national business cycle. The
business cycles of some states largely reflect the business cycle of the national economy,
as expected. Meanwhile, the business cycles of other states are quite varied: recessions
are longer, more frequent, and deeper, for example. Indeed, although the author’s
objective is to demonstrate homogeneity across state-level business cycles, his study
emphasizes the difficulty in doing so. The New England region—including Maine,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut—has the
strongest cohesion index of 0.91, which the author measures through cluster analysis.
The Southwest region—including Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona—has
the weakest cohesion index of 0.55.
The state-level unemployment rate is another macroeconomic variable that differs
greatly from one state to another. With the intent to improve national fiscal policy,
Elmendorf and Dynan (2019) examine the movement of national- and state-level un-
employment rates to compare the volatility of these movements across states and the
national economy. The low-to-high range of national unemployment rates over the
last three decades spanned 6.5 percentage points; meanwhile, the range of state-level
unemployment rates collectively spanned 12.5 percentage points, this after excluding
outliers. Moreover, states occasionally experience an increase in unemployment signif-
icant enough to signal a recession at the state level, even while the nation experiences
growth. For example, during the 1980s, many oil-producing states, including Okla-
homa, Texas, and Wyoming, effectively entered recession while the national economy
did not (Elmendorf and Dynan 2019).
Finally, Owyang, Rapach, and Wall (2009) use a dynamic factor model in order
to address the incomplete information that comes from analyzing the United States
economy through a national lens. The authors use state-level real personal income and
state-level employment growth to demonstrate the heterogeneity that exists across
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state economies. The authors determine that three of the factors they create explain a
sizable portion of the heterogeneity of state-level variables and so too business cycles.
Specifically, the business cycle factor is closely related to the real personal income
growth variable with a statistically significant correlation coefficient of 0.77. The
authors specify the heterogeneity across states through the growth of real personal
income as well as a new business cycle factor, showing that states not only vary from
the national business cycle, but also other states. This heterogeneity is masked by
analyzing the business cycle as an aggregate of state economies, therefore limiting
the ability of aggregate variables to fully represent the state of the nation’s economy
(Owyang, Rapach, and Wall 2009).
To demonstrate the variability of state-level economic outcomes, I focus for now on
real gross state product (GSP), which measures the level of economic output within
state borders. Appropriately transformed, real GSP can reveal state-level business
cyclicality. The Bureau of Economic Analysis provides quarterly data for this measure
for each of the 50 states. The population size of each state affects the level of GSP and,
so, comparing the economic output of, for example, California to that of Delaware
is not appropriate. So, I use the growth rate of the GSP of each state, a common
method of addressing this size difference, so that I can compare state-level economic
fluctuation across states.
In Figure 5, I illustrate the annualized (same-month) growth rate of GSP, for
select states and the nation (in which case I use GDP); the heterogeneity of state-level
economic fluctuations is readily apparent. When the growth rate of GSP measures
zero percent, the level of GSP from one quarter to the next is unchanged. When the
growth rate is above (below) zero percent, GSP grew (fell) in relation to GSP in the
prior quarter.
Figure 5 depicts multiple instances where an individual state’s GSP growth de-
viates from GSP growth of other states and national GDP growth. In regard to the
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timing of fluctuations, for example, initially the growth rate of GSP in Alaska regis-
ters approximately negative 2 percent while the growth rate of GDP for the national
economy registers approximately positive 2 percent. Additionally, while the growth
rate of national GDP falls beginning in 2008, indicating a decline in the production of
GDP at the national level, the growth rates of GSP in some states, namely Delaware
and Washington, continue to register positive values until 2010, at which time the
growth rate of national GDP is once again positive.
In addition to the timing of state-level business cycles, Figure 5 clearly illustrates
the differences in the magnitude of GSP growth across the states. For example, in
1998, when the level of GSP in Alaska fell by around 2 percent, Washington experi-
enced a 10 percent rise in GSP; this 12 percentage point dispersion exemplifies the
large difference in the magnitude of growth experiences across the states. Similarly,
during the recession in 2008, when the level of GSP in Alaska rose by around 10
percent, most other states experienced a significant fall in GSP.
In order to demonstrate the variation in duration of business-cycle phases, such as
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recessions and expansions, I illustrate in Figure 6 GSP relative to its respective value
in December 2007, the NBER-designated date of the national business-cycle peak just
before the Great Recession. This measure represents the economic performance of
the state, across time, as a percentage of a single point in time, thus demonstrating
how each state experienced the aftermath of the Great Recession. When this measure
registers 1, the economic output of the state is equal to that of its December 2007
level. Similarly, when this measure registers below (above) 1, economic output is
below (above) the level of GSP that the state’s economy achieved in December 2007.
Therefore, when this measure is below (above) 1, the state economy is contracting
(expanding) relative to its size in December 2007.
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According to Figure 6, while national economic output fell for several quarters
after the business cycle peak in December 2007, the recession did not negatively affect
economic fluctuations in some states (North Dakota and Alaska) while others have
yet to reach their respective pre-recession levels of GSP (Connecticut and Wyoming).
For the states that experienced a fall in GSP, the duration of the fall differed across
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these states. The United States economy as a whole recovered its pre-recession level
of economic activity around July 2011, and Washington followed suit. In contrast,
Florida did not recover (in this sense) until July 2015 and Nevada recovered yet
another two years after that. Clearly, states experienced very different outcomes in
regard to the lengths of contractions during the most recent recession.
For a clearer understanding of state-level business cyclicality, and in order to ob-
tain the working measure of state-level business cyclicality that I use in my panel
regression analysis that I discuss in Chapter 5, I isolate the cyclical component from
the trend component of national and state-level output measures. In general, the
trend component measures the balanced- (or steady-state-) growth path of the econ-
omy in the long run, when market-clearing prevails; the Solow growth model, for
example, describes this pattern of growth of the economy. Meanwhile, the cyclical
component measures the business cycle. In applied macroeconomics, a conventional
method of decomposing a time series, such as output, into its trend and cyclical com-
ponents is the Hodrick-Prescott filter (hereafter, HP filter), which extracts—that is,
filters—the trend component from the time series; the cyclical component is simply
the difference between the time series and its trend component (Hodrick and Prescott,
1997).
More formally, consider a times series, xt, that includes a trend component, x
τ
t ;
additionally, suppose the series includes T + 1 observations, from observation 0 to
observation T . The HP-filter determines the series, xτt , that minimizes Equation 39,
















The first term in Equation 39 expresses the cyclical component, the difference
between the time series (xt) and its trend component (x
τ
t ); the smaller the magnitude
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of the first term, the less smooth the trend component, which in this case more
or less mimics the actual time series. The second term in Equation 39 expresses









, the smoother the trend component. Imagine, for








for all t; in this
case, the trend component is linear.
Thus, minimizing Equation 39 imposes a trade-off: as the magnitude of the first
term decreases, the smoothness of the trend component decreases (because in this
case the trend component converges on the original time series); as the magnitude of
the second term decreases, the smoothness of the trend component increases. The
term λ determines this trade-off: a relatively large magnitude for lambda causes a
relatively smooth trend; as λ approaches ∞, the trend component becomes linear.
Conventional settings for λ are λ = 100 (annual data), λ = 1600 (quarterly data),
and λ = 14400 (monthly data); I follow this convention.
To demonstrate the effects of this filtering process, in Figure 7 I illustrate United
States GDP for the period 1948Q1 through 2020Q1 and its corresponding HP-filtered
trend component—xτt in the context of Equation 39. In Figure 8, I illustrate, for
the same GDP series, the cyclical component as a share of the trend component—
(xt − xτt ) /xτt in the context of Equation 39. This latter share measure is my working
measure of business cyclicality that I use going forward to estimate and compare
across states cyclical fluctuations in a given business-cycle time series such as GSP
and state-level real personal income.
In Table A1, I report the correlation matrix of the cyclical component of real GSP
of each state. The correlation between the cyclicality of each state and the cyclicality
of the GDP of the United States varies greatly between states. For only 17 states
does the correlation coefficient measure 0.8 or above, signaling a strong correlation
between the cyclicality of the GSP in these states and the cyclicality of GDP.
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Unfortunately, state-level GSP data begin in the first quarter of 2005. Although
GSP is the most accepted measure of the economic performance of a state, the measure
is not available for the timeframe that I need in order to include in my analysis birth
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cohorts from 1950 through 1980. In order to measure the cyclicality of state-level
economic performance around the time of these birth cohorts, I use real total personal
income. I construct this measure by dividing nominal total personal income, which
the Federal Reserve Economic Database provides at a quarterly frequency from 1948
to 2019, by the consumer price index. Real total personal income is a reasonable
proxy for real GSP. Indeed, the two series are highly correlated.
In Table 1, I report, for each state and the nation, correlation coefficients between
real GSP and real total personal income in levels (column 1), HP-filtered trend com-
ponents (column 2), HP-filtered cyclical components (column 3), and the ratio of the
cyclical to trend components (column 4; my working measure of business cyclicality).
For forty states and the nation as a whole (based on the levels of real GDP and
national real total personal income), I report a correlation coefficient above 0.9.
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Table 1: Correlations of State-Level and National Real Personal Income
Levels Trends (t) Cycles (c) c/t %∆t %∆ Levels
AL 0.910 0.953 0.490 0.495 0.589 0.566
AK 0.703 0.819 0.088 0.074 0.872 0.224
AZ 0.951 0.949 0.731 0.735 0.885 0.855
AR 0.945 0.987 0.414 0.434 0.603 0.356
CA 0.990 0.997 0.618 0.632 0.971 0.710
CO 0.992 0.998 0.709 0.716 0.943 0.758
CT -0.058 -0.501 0.620 0.637 0.808 0.614
DE 0.646 0.902 0.657 0.655 0.307 0.553
FL 0.934 0.913 0.696 0.706 0.934 0.828
GA 0.981 0.984 0.666 0.674 0.969 0.713
HI 0.978 0.988 0.461 0.466 0.516 0.526
ID 0.977 0.987 0.542 0.560 0.945 0.594
IL 0.973 0.998 0.736 0.744 0.906 0.707
IN 0.937 0.996 0.456 0.483 0.954 0.455
IA 0.960 0.990 0.609 0.618 0.284 0.511
KS 0.942 0.972 0.675 0.708 0.322 0.664
KY 0.929 0.990 0.367 0.392 0.664 0.404
LA -0.478 -0.756 -0.034 -0.054 -0.585 0.090
ME 0.873 0.910 0.385 0.389 0.993 0.517
MD 0.985 0.998 0.578 0.577 0.760 0.495
MA 0.989 0.997 0.627 0.624 0.939 0.627
MI 0.876 0.912 0.704 0.721 0.990 0.788
MN 0.985 0.997 0.551 0.571 0.971 0.592
MS 0.642 0.855 0.402 0.398 0.661 0.451
MO 0.944 0.993 0.316 0.320 0.853 0.396
MT 0.991 1.000 0.755 0.751 0.850 0.770
NE 0.981 0.998 0.528 0.538 0.899 0.522
NV 0.816 0.740 0.636 0.642 0.919 0.846
NH 0.987 0.999 0.663 0.669 0.960 0.661
NJ 0.906 0.956 0.536 0.539 0.981 0.504
NM 0.929 0.956 0.611 0.591 0.331 0.592
NY 0.957 0.987 0.349 0.340 0.159 0.353
NC 0.981 0.996 0.601 0.609 0.902 0.555
ND 0.991 0.998 0.874 0.832 0.989 0.877
OH 0.953 0.976 0.650 0.660 0.992 0.639
OK 0.928 0.971 0.704 0.708 0.633 0.711
OR 0.992 0.998 0.780 0.787 0.963 0.801
PA 0.988 0.998 0.612 0.611 0.971 0.587
RI 0.782 0.883 0.531 0.541 0.931 0.552
SC 0.982 0.989 0.650 0.669 0.950 0.640
SD 0.979 0.994 0.679 0.686 0.828 0.653
TN 0.979 0.988 0.549 0.553 0.976 0.565
TX 0.990 0.996 0.676 0.668 0.136 0.540
UT 0.995 0.999 0.789 0.807 0.959 0.819
VT 0.928 0.992 0.332 0.315 -0.231 0.363
VA 0.976 0.997 0.431 0.436 0.568 0.467
WA 0.995 0.999 0.761 0.788 0.952 0.775
WV 0.941 0.998 0.586 0.580 0.897 0.606
WI 0.979 0.995 0.595 0.604 0.948 0.553
WY 0.270 0.262 0.521 0.535 0.719 0.621
US 0.995 0.999 0.760 0.770 0.964 0.748
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In Figures 9 and 10, I illustrate the cyclical to trend components of real personal
income for the national economy (Figure 9) and select states (Figure 10). According
to Figure 9, cyclical fluctuations in U.S. real personal income closely correspond to
NBER business-cycle phases: as the nation falls into an NBER-identified recession, for
example, the cyclical component of U.S. real personal income falls as well. Thus, my
working measure of business cyclicality is suitable for my purposes. Moreover, as with
real GSP, state-level real personal income varies substantially across states. According
to Figure 10, the cyclical components (as a percentage of the trend components) of
Louisiana and Oklahoma differ in magnitude as well as direction. For example, around
1957, the cyclical component for Louisiana is positive, which signals an expansion,
while the cyclical component for Oklahoma is negative; meanwhile, the corresponding
measure for the United States is zero. Such variation between states is apparent across
all 50 states through time.
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In Tables 2 and 3, I report summary statistics of the variation across states of
state-level real total personal income during NBER-identified recessions (Table 2)
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and expansions (Table 3). Specifically, I report the standard deviation and the coef-
ficient of variation for the growth rate of real personal income across the individual
states in order to demonstrate state-level variation across business cycles. In Table 2,
the average growth of real personal income is negative, which indicates a recession.
The coefficient of variation—the standard deviation relative to the mean—during
recessions is mostly above one, which indicates relatively high variation. The high
variation of real personal income during periods of recession demonstrates the vastly
different experiences across the individual states.
In Table 3, the coefficient of variation during expansions is mostly below one,
which indicates relatively low variation. During expansions, the variation decreases
and state-level economic fluctuations are less divergent. The coefficient of variation
for the mid 1970s through the 1980s is above one potentially because the expansions
during this time were not very large or long lived. In any case, though the variation
decreases during times of expansion, it does not disappear, implying that state-level
cyclical variations are present during both recession and expansion phases of the
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Table 2: State-Level Real Personal Income Performance during National Recessions
Start End Max. Min. Avg. St. Dev. C.V.
Q3-1953 Q2-1954 11.886% -9.607% 0.772% 4.173% 5.406
Q4-1957 Q2-1958 12.950% -7.945% 0.212% 3.678% 17.333
Q3-1960 Q1-1961 18.558% -3.346% 3.213% 4.261% 1.326
Q1-1970 Q4-1970 10.070% -3.244% 3.103% 2.610% 0.841
Q1-1974 Q1-1975 16.706% -16.632% -0.898% 4.780% 5.326
Q2-1980 Q3-1980 3.757% -18.656% -2.757% 3.798% 1.378
Q4-1981 Q4-1982 16.341% -4.902% 1.025% 3.319% 3.238
Q4-1990 Q1-1991 3.841% -5.561% -0.946% 1.890% 1.999
Q2-2001 Q4-2001 3.353% -2.449% 0.667% 1.224% 1.835
Q1-2008 Q2-2009 6.695% -6.133% -0.408% 2.557% 6.272
business cycle.
Table 3: State-Level Real Personal Income Performance during National Expansions
Start End Max. Min. Avg. St. Dev. C.V.
Q1-1950 Q2-1953 22.012% -6.589% 6.611% 5.100% 0.771
Q3-1954 Q3-1957 14.336% -5.111% 4.984% 3.802% 0.763
Q3-1958 Q2-1960 12.837% -6.910% 3.851% 3.676% 0.955
Q2-1961 Q4-1969 14.386% -3.768% 4.966% 3.158% 0.636
Q1-1971 Q4-1973 20.459% 0.923% 6.351% 3.380% 0.532
Q2-1975 Q1-1980 13.191% -6.676% 2.868% 3.203% 1.117
Q4-1980 Q3-1981 14.745% -7.584% 1.816% 3.428% 1.887
Q1-1983 Q3-1990 8.444% -4.550% 3.219% 2.512% 0.780
Q2-1991 Q1-2001 7.666% -1.498% 3.133% 1.815% 0.579
Q1-2002 Q4-2007 8.183% -1.484% 2.416% 1.955% 0.809
Finally, another common indicator of economic activity is the unemployment rate.
The unemployment rate is a reliably countercyclical measure of aggregate economic
fluctuations. Nevertheless, state-level unemployment rates vary substantially across
states. In fact, Dynan and Elmendorf (2019) use the state-level population weighted
unemployment rate to highlight the differences in cyclical outcomes across states,
and to emphasize the importance of recognizing this heterogeneity when crafting
macroeconomic stabilization policies. In Figure 11, I illustrate the monthly standard
deviation of state-level unemployment rates, along with NBER recession bars. When
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the national economy is in recession, the standard deviation across states increases,
reflecting the varied state-level responses to adverse aggregate shocks.
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The unemployment rate proves insightful for understanding state-level economic
fluctuations in yet another way. In 2019, Claudia Sahm, director of macroeconomic
policy at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth and formerly with the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, developed an elegant recession-warning
indicator that, according to the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “signals the start
of a recession when the three-month moving average of the national unemployment
rate rises by 0.50 percentage points or more relative to its low during the previous
12 months.” The Sahm recession indicator, coined the Sahm rule, is now a standard
fixture of reduced-form recession indicators. In Figure 12, I illustrate the Sahm
rule for the national economy; the strength of the relationship between the rule and
recessions is evident: the Sahm rule consistently registers above 0.5 at the beginning
of each NBER-indicated recession.
I reason that this tool can be applied to state-level unemployment rates in order
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Figure 1: Sahm−Rule Recession Indicator
to identify state-level business cycles and, ultimately, to illustrate how these cycles
vary across states. I use the Sahm-rule formula with state-level unemployment rates
to identify state-level recessions. In Figure 13, I illustrate the Sahm rule applied to
monthly state-level unemployment rates, from 1990 to 1994. This period includes a
national recession. Above the name of each state along the horizontal axis are the
Sahm rule values during the 60 months that span 1990 to 1994; each box indicates
the middle quartile of the Sahm rule values, the top and bottom segments represent
the top and bottom quartiles, and a dot outside a whisker is an outlier. For example,
based on the Sahm rule, the monthly unemployment rate in Maine places that state
in recession in 24 of the 60 months from 1990 to 1994. On average, from 1990 to 1994,
the state-level Sahm rule indicates a recession in 19 of the 60 months for a given state.
In Figure 14, I illustrate the Sahm rule for the years 1995 through 1999, a span
of time when the national economy expanded. During a national expansion, not
surprisingly, the Sahm rule does not signal recession for the national economy but
this is not the case for all fifty states. For nineteen states, there are several months
during which the Sahm rule signals recession. For example, in the case of South
52




























































































































































































































































Carolina, the Sahm rule signals 20 (of 60) months of recession.





























































































































































































































































In summary, using several different measures of state-level aggregate economic
fluctuations, I am able to demonstrate the heterogeneous nature of state-level eco-
nomic fluctuations. This state-level heterogeneity, like the state-level heterogeneity of
rates of absolute income mobility, occurs through time, affording me a panel dataset
and the opportunity to test my central hypothesis that aggregate economic fluctua-
tions affect intergenerational mobility. Essentially, states experience economic shocks
differently, resulting, according to my argument in Chapter 3.2, in differing credit





In this section, I define and discuss the measures I use in my panel regression equa-
tions. Then, I discuss my empirical results of tests of the relationship between aggre-
gate economic performance and the rate of absolute income mobility, both of which
I measure across states and time. This is to say, I test my central hypothesis that
business cycles drive intergenerational-mobility outcomes of children, conditional on
the income percentile rank of their parents. I reason that low economic performance
tightens borrowing constraints, thus restricting the amount a parent invests in the
human capital of her child and, consequently, limiting the foundational skills and the
expected earnings of the child.
My first independent variable is the average ratio of cyclical to trend components
of state-level real personal income. I construct this variable using the HP-filter, as I
discuss in Chapter 4, on quarterly data for real personal income from 1950 to 1989. I
divide the cyclical component by the trend component because the cyclical component
of real personal income for each state varies in magnitude across states due to the
different sizes and populations of the states. Dividing the cyclical component by the
trend component creates a standardized and easily interpreted measure: the ratio
of cyclical to trend components is positive during expansions and negative during
recessions. Additionally, the measure is scaled by the respective state-level long-run
trend, which is relatively similar across states.
For each state and birth cohort, I average the ratio of cyclical to trend components
for the foundational years of the childhood—the decade following the year indicating
the birth cohort. For example, for a given state and, say, the 1950 birth cohort, I
average the ratio of cyclical to trend components from 1950 to 1959, during which
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the age of a child in the 1950 birth cohort ranges anywhere from 0 (born in 1950) to
18 (born in 1941). Because my mobility measures rely on census data, the children
in birth-cohort Year-x were born anytime between Year-x minus 9 years and Year
x. Importantly, no observations associated with a particular birth-cohort average of
the ratio of cyclical to trend components overlap with the observations of another
birth-cohort average associated with the same state: for example, the observations
associated with the average ratio of cyclical to trend components for the 1950 birth
cohort span 1950 to 1959; the comparable range for the 1960 birth cohort spans 1960
to 1969.
Additionally, I construct a five-year average as well: for example, for birth cohort
1950, I average the ratio of cyclical to trend components from 1950 to 1954, during
which the age of a child in the 1950 birth cohort ranges anywhere from 0 (born in
1950) to 13 (born in 1941). This is my second independent variable. Finally, my third
independent variable is the average state-level unemployment rate, a mean-reverting
(stationary) series that I do not filter or otherwise transform in any way.
Crime rates are a potential determinant of mobility that may be correlated with
the business cycle; if so, excluding the crime rate would create an omitted variable bias
when regressing state-level mobility on the cyclical component of real personal income.
In order to address this issue, I include both property and violent crime as explanatory
variables in my regression. Since 1960, the Justice department provides the annual
property and violent crime rates of each state per 100,000 individuals. I average the
state-level crime rates that each family experiences during the foundational years of
the child. For example, for the 1960 birth cohort, I average the state-level crime rates
between the years 1960 and 1969.
My dependent variable is the state-level rate of absolute income mobility condi-
tional on parental income percentile rank for the birth cohorts 1950, 1960, 1970, and
1980 (see Equation 5 and, for example, Figure 1). I retrieve these data from the
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datasets and code that accompany Chetty et al. (2017). The authors use decennial
census data and Current Population Survey data in order to measure the marginal
distribution of income for both parents and children. These cross-sectional data allow
the authors to measure the household income for parents and children when they are
about 30 years old, adjusting for inflation. Additionally, Chetty et al. (2017) use data
from de-identified tax returns and measure household income as pre-tax income filed
on tax returns. Using all these data, the authors are able to link parents to children
and calculate the rate of absolute income mobility.
Each of the state-level rates of absolute income mobility for the birth cohorts 1950,
1960, 1970, and 1980 represents the probability a child born in the corresponding state
and cohort, say 1950, will earn a larger income than her parent did, conditional on
her parental income percentile rank when she was born. In Figures 15 through 18,
I illustrate the downward trend and interstate variability of this measure over time
throughout the United States for the 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980 birth cohorts, for




. (For example, the rates associated with South
Dakota in Figures 15 and 18 correspond to the y-axis values for the 1950 and 1980
birth cohorts at parental percentile rank 50 in Figure 1). In these figures, the areas
that appear darker have the highest percentage of children who earn more income
than their parents did. Across the United States, mobility for the 1950 birth cohort
(Figure 15) is similar. Though compared to Figures 16, 17, and 18, in which I
illustrate A1960,5̃0, A1970,5̃0, and A1980,5̃0 respectively, it is clear that the percentage of
children who earn more income than their parents did has decreased generally over
time, meanwhile, more variation is apparent throughout the United States for the
1980 birth cohort.
I reason that the differences in state economic performance play a role in the
outcome of the child’s income percentile rank, conditional on state-specific character-
istics that may shape intergenerational mobility. Specifically, if during the childhood
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Figure 15: Rate of Absolute Income Mobility, 1950 Birth Cohort
Figure 16: Rate of Absolute Income Mobility, 1960 Birth Cohort
Figure 17: Rate of Absolute Income Mobility, 1970 Birth Cohort
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Figure 18: Rate of Absolute Income Mobility, 1980 Birth Cohort
of the 1950s birth cohort, California’s economy as a whole outperforms Louisiana’s
economy (measured as the ratio of cyclical to trend components of state-level real
total personal income), the children in California will have a better chance of earning
a level of income that is above the level their parent earned, conditional on being
born in California to parents in a particular income percentile rank.
I report the summary statistics of my data in Table 4. The independent variables,
c̃i,t, represent the average business cycle experienced by families during the founda-
tional years of the children. A negative c̃i,Y,10 and c̃i,Y,5 value represents a decrease in
the cyclical component of real personal income as a percentage of trend; therefore, the
negative minimum value in the average economic fluctuations represents a recession
experienced by families. I exploit the heterogeneity of economic fluctuations expe-
rienced by four cohorts of children across each of the states, providing me with 200
separate experiences and therefore data points. In general, the mean of the rate of
absolute income mobility, Ac,p̃, at each parent percentile rank decreases as the parent
percentile rank increases.
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Table 4: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Min Max Mean St. Dev. Obs.
c̃i,Y,10 -0.882 0.669 -0.003 0.275 200
c̃i,Y,5 -2.628 1.867 0.215 0.557 200
c̃i,U,4 2.742 10.910 6.056 1.669 86
pcrime 746.8 6978.1 3569.0 1488.3 150
vcrime 24.3 1007.0 314.3 211.3 150
Ac,1̃0 0.079 0.929 0.783 0.094 191
Ac,2̃0 0.112 0.915 0.712 0.120 191
Ac,3̃0 0.126 0.892 0.676 0.131 191
Ac,4̃0 0.134 0.885 0.658 0.139 191
Ac,5̃0 0.138 0.879 0.638 0.142 191
Ac,6̃0 0.138 0.860 0.616 0.141 191
Ac,7̃0 0.142 0.842 0.591 0.144 191
Ac,8̃0 0.142 0.801 0.547 0.145 191
Ac,9̃0 0.141 0.728 0.472 0.142 191
Ac,1̃00 0.000 0.552 0.161 0.106 191
5.2 Panel Regressions and Estimates
I estimate specifications that take the general, minimalist form of Equation 40 (while
accounting for state fixed effects in order to remove the variable bias that results
from the heterogenous economic performance of each state), where Ac,p̃ is the rate
of absolute income mobility at percentile rank p for birth cohort c; xi,t is a vector
of observable variables that vary across states (that is, i), across time (that is, t),
or some combination of both states and time; ω is the coefficient on the continuous
independent variable, c̃i,t—for example, the ten-year average over decade t of the
state-i ratio of cyclical to trend components of real personal income—and ui captures
unobserved heterogeneity across states. I am primarily interested in the estimate of
ω.
Ap̃,c,i,t = xi,tβ + ωc̃i,t + ui + υi,t (40)
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In Tables 5 and 6, I report results for the ten-year average ratio of cyclical to trend
components of real personal income. Based on my modeling, I expect the results to
yield positive values for the coefficient ω, which in this case I label ωY,10. Recall, Ap̃,c
is the rate of absolute income mobility for cohort c conditional on parental income
percentile rank p̃. Tables 5 and 6 include results for p̃ = 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50 and
p̃ = 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100 respectively. The sign of the estimated coefficient for ωY,10
is positive, as expected: the rate of absolute income mobility at income percentile rank
p̃ is positively correlated with average cyclical fluctuations in the economy in which
the child lived sometime between the ages of 0 and 18, during which investments in
the human capital of the child were presumably formative.
Table 5: Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 10 ≤ p̃ ≤ 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,1̃0 Ac,2̃0 Ac,3̃0 Ac,4̃0 Ac,5̃0
ωY,10 0.130*** 0.191*** 0.216*** 0.226*** 0.230***
(0.0158) (0.0203) (0.0225) (0.0248) (0.0245)
Constant 0.786*** 0.715*** 0.678*** 0.660*** 0.640***
(1.69e-05) (2.17e-05) (2.40e-05) (2.64e-05) (2.60e-05)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
R-squared 0.238 0.227 0.227 0.216 0.212
Number of state code 50 50 50 50 50
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE No No No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In Table 5, I report that ωY,10 is statistically significant (for p < 0.01) at each par-
ent percentile rank, p̃ = 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50. Accounting for state fixed effects, ωY,10
is 0.13 for a parental percentile rank of 10 (p̃ = 10). Therefore, one percentage-point
positive cyclical fluctuation (as a percentage of trend) during the decade following
the year indicating the cohort implies a 13 basis points increase in the probability a
child will earn more income than their parent did. The impact of cyclical fluctuations
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increases as p̃ increases, implying that an increase in economic fluctuations increase
the rate of absolute income mobility more for the children born to parents in the
middle range of income percentile ranks.
Table 6: Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 60 ≤ p̃ ≤ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,6̃0 Ac,7̃0 Ac,8̃0 Ac,9̃0 Ac,1̃00
ωY,10 0.218*** 0.227*** 0.234*** 0.230*** 0.114***
(0.0247) (0.0242) (0.0240) (0.0263) (0.0221)
Constant 0.617*** 0.591*** 0.547*** 0.472*** 0.159***
(2.63e-05) (2.57e-05) (2.55e-05) (2.80e-05) (2.36e-05)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
R-squared 0.198 0.209 0.218 0.227 0.155
Number of state code 50 50 50 50 50
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE No No No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In Table 6 I report results associated with parent percentile ranks, p̃ = 60, 70, 80,
90, and 100. Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of ωY,10 is the highest for p̃ = 80,
implying that a one percentage-point positive cyclical fluctuation (as a percentage of
trend) increases by 23 basis points the probability a child born to a parent in the
80th income percentile will earn more income than their parent did. The R2 in each
case that I report in Tables 5 and 6 is about 0.2, implying that the percentage of
variation explained by the model is low. This is not necessarily a problem; however,
in order to account for any variation coming from the time series data, I add cohort
fixed effects for the next set of panel regressions.
In the panel regressions associated with Tables 7 and 8, I include cohort (decade)
dummies in order to capture statewide trends in the rate of absolute income mobility.
Again, the results of these panel regressions, for which I expect the sign on the
estimated value for ωY,10 to be positive, include results for p = 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50
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and p = 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100 respectively. The inclusion of cohort dummies seems
most appropriate given the (downward) trend in intergenerational mobility.
Table 7: Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 10 ≤ p̃ ≤ 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,1̃0 Ac,2̃0 Ac,3̃0 Ac,4̃0 Ac,5̃0
ωY,10 0.00893 0.00784 0.0198 0.0213 0.0381**
(0.0266) (0.0182) (0.0211) (0.0199) (0.0153)
1960.cohort -0.0781*** -0.120*** -0.130*** -0.134*** -0.120***
(0.0130) (0.00986) (0.0108) (0.0105) (0.00889)
1970.cohort -0.0992*** -0.167*** -0.195*** -0.213*** -0.219***
(0.00503) (0.00567) (0.00545) (0.00585) (0.00567)
1980.cohort -0.176*** -0.276*** -0.307*** -0.329*** -0.329***
(0.0112) (0.00865) (0.00975) (0.00919) (0.00812)
Constant 0.875*** 0.856*** 0.836*** 0.829*** 0.807***
(0.00628) (0.00502) (0.00532) (0.00531) (0.00476)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
R-squared 0.854 0.934 0.940 0.949 0.958
Number of state code 50 50 50 50 50
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In Table 7, I report estimates of ωY,10 that are smaller than those I reported
earlier, and the estimate of ωY,10 is statistically significant only for the case of p̃ = 50.
Therefore, accounting for both state and cohort fixed effects, a one percentage-point
positive cyclical fluctuation (as a percentage of trend) increases by about 4 basis
points the rate of absolute income mobility conditional on a parental percentile rank
equal to 50. The cohort dummies are in relation to the 1950 cohort; therefore the
negative coefficient estimates are as I expect: the rate of absolute income mobility
has decreased in relation to the 1950 birth cohort. Focusing on Table 8, the estimated
coefficient for ωY,10 is statistically significant conditional on p̃ = 70, 80, and 90.
Generally speaking, I interpret these results in Tables 7 and 8 to mean that cyclical
fluctuations during childhood drive the rate of absolute income mobility conditional
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Table 8: Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 60 ≤ p̃ ≤ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,6̃0 Ac,7̃0 Ac,8̃0 Ac,9̃0 Ac,1̃00
ωY,10 0.0206 0.0368** 0.0385** 0.0405** 0.0228
(0.0125) (0.0176) (0.0147) (0.0178) (0.0304)
1960.cohort -0.127*** -0.124*** -0.135*** -0.141*** -0.0559***
(0.00717) (0.00990) (0.0101) (0.0133) (0.0199)
1970.cohort -0.219*** -0.224*** -0.230*** -0.227*** -0.0551***
(0.00664) (0.00782) (0.00852) (0.00963) (0.0186)
1980.cohort -0.332*** -0.327*** -0.328*** -0.310*** -0.119***
(0.00704) (0.00831) (0.00939) (0.0124) (0.0211)
Constant 0.786*** 0.760*** 0.720*** 0.640*** 0.217***
(0.00437) (0.00575) (0.00610) (0.00797) (0.0136)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
R-squared 0.954 0.946 0.935 0.907 0.377
Number of state code 50 50 50 50 50
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
on parental income percentile ranks that are middling to high: specifically, p̃ = 50,
70, 80, and 90. Thus, in the context of my modeling, economic contractions bind
the intertemporal budgets of middle to relatively high-income households. In each
case, the estimated coefficient for ωY,10 is roughly 0.04; thus, a one percentage-point
positive cyclical fluctuation (as a percentage of trend) increases the child’s rate of
absolute income mobility by 4 basis points. The R2 values are significantly higher
when I include cohort dummies in the panel regression.
In Tables 5 through 8, I include every state in my analysis, resulting in an unbal-
anced panel because I do not have rates of absolute income mobility for a few states
for some parental percentile ranks; for example, I do not have values for Alaska and
Hawaii for the 1950 birth cohort because the cohort date precedes statehood in both
cases. Therefore, in Tables 9 through 12, I drop the states with missing variables:
namely Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota,
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Vermont, and Wyoming. This creates a balanced panel of 41 states across 4 birth
cohorts; therefore, the number of observations associated with this balanced panel is
164. I report results for the balanced panel regressions for p̃ = 10, 20, 30, 40, and 50
and p̃ = 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100 in Tables 9 and 10, respectively.
Table 9: Balanced Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 10 ≤ p̃ ≤ 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,1̃0 Ac,2̃0 Ac,3̃0 Ac,4̃0 Ac,5̃0
ωY,10 0.146*** 0.203*** 0.231*** 0.240*** 0.239***
(0.0166) (0.0264) (0.0294) (0.0322) (0.0332)
Constant 0.784*** 0.712*** 0.675*** 0.656*** 0.636***
(0.000134) (0.000214) (0.000238) (0.000261) (0.000270)
Observations 164 164 164 164 164
R-squared 0.247 0.210 0.213 0.200 0.190
Number of state code 41 41 41 41 41
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE No No No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In Table 9, I report results that are similar to those I report earlier: ωY,10 at
each p̃ is positive and statistically significant. My estimates of ωY,10 for each p̃ are
slightly larger than those I obtain in my unbalanced panel regressions; for example,
Ac,2̃0 increases by 1 basis point. Therefore, a one percentage-point positive cyclical
fluctuation (as a percentage of trend) increases by 20 basis points the fraction of
children earning more income than their parents did.
In Table 10, I report statistically significant estimates of ωY,10 across all parental
percentile ranks. For example, the estimate of ωY,10, conditional on p̃ = 90, is 0.256,
which implies that a one percentage-point positive cyclical fluctuation (as a percentage
of trend) increases the child’s rate of absolute income mobility by about 26 basis
points. The estimate of ωY,10 conditional on p̃ = 100 is (only) 0.11, implying that
households in the top parental income percentile rank are less sensitive to cyclical
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Table 10: Balanced Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 60 ≤ p̃ ≤
100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,6̃0 Ac,7̃0 Ac,8̃0 Ac,9̃0 Ac,1̃00
ωY,10 0.237*** 0.244*** 0.250*** 0.256*** 0.110***
(0.0327) (0.0324) (0.0324) (0.0327) (0.0232)
Constant 0.613*** 0.588*** 0.543*** 0.467*** 0.141***
(0.000265) (0.000263) (0.000262) (0.000265) (0.000188)
Observations 164 164 164 164 164
R-squared 0.186 0.193 0.201 0.226 0.143
Number of state code 41 41 41 41 41
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE No No No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
fluctuations (as a percentage of trend).
Table 11: Balanced Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 10 ≤ p̃ ≤ 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,1̃0 Ac,2̃0 Ac,3̃0 Ac,4̃0 Ac,5̃0
ωY,10 0.00967 0.0117 0.0304** 0.0351** 0.0537***
(0.0111) (0.0163) (0.0141) (0.0131) (0.0124)
1960.cohort -0.0846*** -0.125*** -0.134*** -0.137*** -0.124***
(0.00617) (0.00935) (0.00865) (0.00876) (0.00881)
1970.cohort -0.0984*** -0.167*** -0.195*** -0.214*** -0.221***
(0.00399) (0.00531) (0.00491) (0.00528) (0.00542)
1980.cohort -0.183*** -0.279*** -0.311*** -0.332*** -0.330***
(0.00719) (0.00821) (0.00757) (0.00768) (0.00777)
Constant 0.876*** 0.857*** 0.836*** 0.828*** 0.806***
(0.00329) (0.00463) (0.00436) (0.00463) (0.00471)
Observations 164 164 164 164 164
R-squared 0.916 0.948 0.963 0.968 0.968
Number of state code 41 41 41 41 41
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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In Tables 11 and 12, I report results based on a balanced panel regression that
includes both state and cohort fixed effects, conditional on p̃ = 10, 20, 30, 40, and
50 and p̃ = 60, 70, 80, 90, and 100, respectively. In Table 11, when I account for
both state and cohort fixed effects in the balanced panel regression, the statistical
significance holds for p̃ = 30, 40, and 50. Additionally, the value of ωY,10 increases
(relative to the corresponding unbalanced-panel result) for almost all parental per-
centile ranks. Nevertheless, the rate of absolute income mobility for children born to
parents in p̃ = 10 and p̃ = 20 is not statistically significantly associated with cyclical
fluctuations. I reason this is because an adverse aggregate shock, which tightens credit
constraints, does not affect the amount a parent from the bottom income percentile
invests in the human capital of their child; perhaps this is because the parents in the
bottom income percentiles have less access to loans in the first place and therefore
are not sensitive to economic fluctuations in the way my modeling proposes.
In Table 12, I report statistically significant results conditional on p̃ = 60, 70, 80,
and 90. Specifically, the rate of absolute income mobility conditional on the parent
percentile p̃ = 70 increases by 6.5 basis points due to a one percentage-point fluc-
tuation in the business cycle. I reason that households in the parental percentile
ranks of 60, 70, 80, and 90 have greater access to and rely relatively more on in-
termediated credit; therefore economic fluctuations affect the percentage of children
who earn more than their parents in the medium- to high-income households. In this
series of regressions, the R2 is around 0.96, which implies that much of the variation
is explained by this model.
In Tables 13 through 20, I report panel regressions for which my independent
variable is the five-year (as opposed to the ten-year) average ratio of cyclical to trend
components. I begin with the panel regressions for all states, accounting for state
fixed effects. I expect the estimated value for ωY,5 to be positive. I discuss my results
for regression equations in which I include cohort dummies; thus, I discuss Tables 15
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Table 12: Balanced Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 60 ≤ p̃ ≤
100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,6̃0 Ac,7̃0 Ac,8̃0 Ac,9̃0 Ac,1̃00
ωY,10 0.0531*** 0.0653*** 0.0602*** 0.0681*** -0.0137
(0.0124) (0.0167) (0.0154) (0.0218) (0.0377)
1960.cohort -0.124*** -0.126*** -0.140*** -0.150*** -0.0820***
(0.00842) (0.0107) (0.0118) (0.0171) (0.0210)
1970.cohort -0.223*** -0.230*** -0.236*** -0.233*** -0.0534***
(0.00630) (0.00731) (0.00812) (0.00936) (0.0189)
1980.cohort -0.330*** -0.328*** -0.330*** -0.309*** -0.120***
(0.00698) (0.00837) (0.00940) (0.0127) (0.0218)
Constant 0.784*** 0.760*** 0.721*** 0.641*** 0.205***
(0.00465) (0.00585) (0.00644) (0.00907) (0.0141)
Observations 164 164 164 164 164
R-squared 0.967 0.962 0.952 0.932 0.372
Number of state code 41 41 41 41 41
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
and 16 for the unbalanced panel regressions and Tables 19 and 20 for the balanced
panel regressions for which I drop the same 9 states because of missing values (of the
rate of absolute income mobility).
In Tables 15 and 16, I report no statistically significant estimates of the value for
ωY,5. It seems that the five-year average of the cyclical component (as a percentage of
trend) fails to adequately capture business cyclicality because economic fluctuations
may affect the rate of absolute income mobility with a lag. Specifically, the cyclical
fluctuations early in the childhood may not tighten the credit constraints of a parent
immediately. An alternative explanation for why I do not obtain statistically signif-
icant results using the five-year average is that in this case the children are between
the ages of 0 and 13; therefore, the children are not of college attendance age, when
skills formed may be particularly lucrative in increasing future economic outcomes.
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Table 13: Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 10 ≤ p̃ ≤ 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,1̃0 Ac,2̃0 Ac,3̃0 Ac,4̃0 Ac,5̃0
ωY,5 -0.0291** -0.0374* -0.0446** -0.0484** -0.0475**
(0.0117) (0.0191) (0.0214) (0.0227) (0.0235)
Constant 0.794*** 0.725*** 0.690*** 0.673*** 0.653***
(0.00312) (0.00510) (0.00574) (0.00607) (0.00628)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
R-squared 0.027 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.020
Number of state code 50 50 50 50 50
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE No No No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 14: Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 60 ≤ p̃ ≤ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,6̃0 Ac,7̃0 Ac,8̃0 Ac,9̃0 Ac,1̃00
ωY,5 -0.0451* -0.0422* -0.0349 -0.0340 -0.0162
(0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0239) (0.0225) (0.0131)
Constant 0.628*** 0.602*** 0.556*** 0.480*** 0.163***
(0.00610) (0.00611) (0.00640) (0.00602) (0.00351)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
R-squared 0.019 0.016 0.011 0.011 0.007
Number of state code 50 50 50 50 50
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE No No No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
My results for the corresponding balanced-panel regressions, which I report in Tables
19 through 20, are substantially identical to my unbalanced-panel results in this case.
In Tables 21 through 24, I report results of (only) balanced panel regressions for
which my independent variable is the average unemployment rate, which is cyclical
in nature. The state-level unemployment rate is available back to the year 1976.
Therefore, I am not able to use every birth cohort. Instead, I focus on the 1970
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Table 15: Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 10 ≤ p̃ ≤ 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,1̃0 Ac,2̃0 Ac,3̃0 Ac,4̃0 Ac,5̃0
ωY,5 -0.00790 -0.00201 -0.00758 -0.00624 0.00208
(0.00879) (0.00804) (0.00823) (0.00754) (0.00613)
1960.cohort -0.0851*** -0.124*** -0.142*** -0.145*** -0.135***
(0.00627) (0.00700) (0.00791) (0.00754) (0.00759)
1970.cohort -0.102*** -0.168*** -0.199*** -0.216*** -0.221***
(0.00623) (0.00623) (0.00702) (0.00695) (0.00683)
1980.cohort -0.178*** -0.278*** -0.314*** -0.337*** -0.345***
(0.00673) (0.00609) (0.00688) (0.00708) (0.00651)
Constant 0.880*** 0.859*** 0.844*** 0.836*** 0.815***
(0.00460) (0.00484) (0.00553) (0.00510) (0.00511)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
R-squared 0.855 0.934 0.939 0.948 0.955
Number of state code 50 50 50 50 50
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
and 1980 birth cohorts. In this case, I average the unemployment rate for the years
1976 through 1979 for the 1970 birth cohort. And I average the unemployment rate
for the years 1986 through 1989 for the 1980 birth cohort. I expect the estimate of
the value of ωU,4 to be negative because the unemployment rate is countercyclical.
My balanced panel excludes states for which values of the rate of absolute income
mobility for the 1970 birth cohort are missing: namely, Delaware, Idaho, Montana,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. In Tables 23 and 24, in which
I report results of regressions that include both state and cohort fixed effects, the
estimated values of ωU,4 are negative, as expected, conditional on p̃ = 40, 50, 60, and
100. Nevertheless, none of these results are statistically significant.
Next, I report results for which my regression equation includes the explanatory
variables for property and violent crimes. In tables 25 and 26, I regress the rate
of absolute mobility on real personal income averaged over 10 years, c̃i,Y,10, while
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Table 16: Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 60 ≤ p̃ ≤ 100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,6̃0 Ac,7̃0 Ac,8̃0 Ac,9̃0 Ac,1̃00
ωY,5 0.00262 0.00339 0.00568 -0.00932 0.00141
(0.00823) (0.00878) (0.00840) (0.0117) (0.0111)
1960.cohort -0.135*** -0.138*** -0.149*** -0.162*** -0.0650***
(0.00829) (0.00924) (0.00956) (0.0121) (0.0148)
1970.cohort -0.220*** -0.226*** -0.231*** -0.233*** -0.0563***
(0.00790) (0.00900) (0.00948) (0.0107) (0.0187)
1980.cohort -0.340*** -0.343*** -0.345*** -0.325*** -0.128***
(0.00759) (0.00837) (0.00873) (0.00984) (0.0165)
Constant 0.790*** 0.767*** 0.726*** 0.654*** 0.222***
(0.00624) (0.00676) (0.00677) (0.00817) (0.0121)
Observations 191 191 191 191 191
R-squared 0.953 0.943 0.932 0.905 0.374
Number of state code 50 50 50 50 50
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 17: Balanced Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 10 ≤ p̃ ≤ 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,1̃0 Ac,2̃0 Ac,3̃0 Ac,4̃0 Ac,5̃0
ωY,5 -0.0419*** -0.0586*** -0.0670*** -0.0706*** -0.0689**
(0.0131) (0.0199) (0.0227) (0.0244) (0.0255)
Constant 0.797*** 0.731*** 0.696*** 0.678*** 0.657***
(0.00370) (0.00559) (0.00640) (0.00685) (0.00719)
Observations 164 164 164 164 164
R-squared 0.051 0.043 0.044 0.043 0.039
Number of state code 41 41 41 41 41
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE No No No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
accounting for property and crime rates (per 100,000 individuals), pcrime and vcrime.
Unfortunately, because the crime rate data begin in 1960, I must drop the 1950 birth
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Table 18: Balanced Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 60 ≤ p̃ ≤
100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,6̃0 Ac,7̃0 Ac,8̃0 Ac,9̃0 Ac,1̃00
ωY,5 -0.0667** -0.0626** -0.0539** -0.0410 -0.0130
(0.0254) (0.0252) (0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0117)
Constant 0.634*** 0.607*** 0.560*** 0.480*** 0.145***
(0.00714) (0.00710) (0.00744) (0.00745) (0.00329)
Observations 164 164 164 164 164
R-squared 0.037 0.031 0.023 0.014 0.005
Number of state code 41 41 41 41 41
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE No No No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 19: Balanced Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 10 ≤ p̃ ≤ 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,1̃0 Ac,2̃0 Ac,3̃0 Ac,4̃0 Ac,5̃0
ωY,5 -0.00132 0.000992 -0.00332 0.000877 0.00700
(0.00919) (0.00876) (0.00758) (0.00636) (0.00602)
1960.cohort -0.0892*** -0.129*** -0.148*** -0.151*** -0.145***
(0.00537) (0.00641) (0.00690) (0.00662) (0.00706)
1970.cohort -0.0992*** -0.167*** -0.198*** -0.215*** -0.222***
(0.00447) (0.00540) (0.00564) (0.00592) (0.00651)
1980.cohort -0.186*** -0.283*** -0.321*** -0.345*** -0.351***
(0.00576) (0.00606) (0.00623) (0.00609) (0.00668)
Constant 0.879*** 0.859*** 0.844*** 0.835*** 0.815***
(0.00387) (0.00438) (0.00434) (0.00435) (0.00491)
Observations 164 164 164 164 164
R-squared 0.916 0.947 0.961 0.966 0.965
Number of state code 41 41 41 41 41
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
cohort data. Once again, I expect the relationship between real personal income and
the rate of absolute mobility to be positive.
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Table 20: Balanced Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Real Personal Income, 60 ≤ p̃ ≤
100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,6̃0 Ac,7̃0 Ac,8̃0 Ac,9̃0 Ac,1̃00
ωY,5 0.00967 0.00901 0.0107 0.00455 0.00940
(0.00593) (0.00760) (0.00775) (0.0101) (0.0119)
1960.cohort -0.143*** -0.150*** -0.162*** -0.177*** -0.0727***
(0.00738) (0.00825) (0.00884) (0.0114) (0.0155)
1970.cohort -0.223*** -0.230*** -0.235*** -0.234*** -0.0500**
(0.00738) (0.00897) (0.00946) (0.0103) (0.0194)
1980.cohort -0.351*** -0.353*** -0.354*** -0.335*** -0.117***
(0.00664) (0.00740) (0.00773) (0.00971) (0.0162)
Constant 0.792*** 0.771*** 0.729*** 0.654*** 0.199***
(0.00531) (0.00623) (0.00634) (0.00766) (0.0125)
Observations 164 164 164 164 164
R-squared 0.964 0.957 0.948 0.926 0.372
Number of state code 41 41 41 41 41
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 21: Balanced Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Unemployment Rate, 10 ≤ p̃ ≤ 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,1̃0 Ac,2̃0 Ac,3̃0 Ac,4̃0 Ac,5̃0
ωU,4 0.00684 0.00893 0.00903 0.00825 0.00763
(0.00626) (0.00844) (0.00880) (0.00888) (0.00876)
Constant 0.689*** 0.574*** 0.523*** 0.500*** 0.480***
(0.0387) (0.0522) (0.0544) (0.0549) (0.0542)
Observations 86 86 86 86 86
R-squared 0.023 0.024 0.022 0.017 0.015
Number of state code 43 43 43 43 43
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE No No No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In Tables 25 and 26, I report a positive relationship between mobility and economic
fluctuations. Much of the statistical significance (that I report in Tables 11 and 12 for
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Table 22: Balanced Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Unemployment Rate, 60 ≤ p̃ ≤
100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,6̃0 Ac,7̃0 Ac,8̃0 Ac,9̃0 Ac,1̃00
ωU,4 0.00835 0.00920 0.0124 0.0109 0.00129
(0.00876) (0.00865) (0.00773) (0.00660) (0.00473)
Constant 0.452*** 0.419*** 0.356*** 0.297*** 0.110***
(0.0541) (0.0535) (0.0478) (0.0408) (0.0292)
Observations 86 86 86 86 86
R-squared 0.019 0.025 0.048 0.049 0.001
Number of state code 43 43 43 43 43
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE No No No No No
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 23: Balanced Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Unemployment Rate, 10 ≤ p̃ ≤ 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,1̃0 Ac,2̃0 Ac,3̃0 Ac,4̃0 Ac,5̃0
ωU,4 0.00101 0.000870 0.000418 -0.000767 -0.00123
(0.00460) (0.00387) (0.00343) (0.00329) (0.00300)
1980.cohort -0.0813*** -0.113*** -0.120*** -0.126*** -0.124***
(0.00645) (0.00621) (0.00523) (0.00518) (0.00538)
Constant 0.766*** 0.680*** 0.637*** 0.619*** 0.596***
(0.0274) (0.0235) (0.0211) (0.0199) (0.0197)
Observations 86 86 86 86 86
R-squared 0.764 0.878 0.922 0.927 0.934
Number of state code 43 43 43 43 43
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
example) does not hold when I include the explanatory crime rate variables. Though,
I do not attribute the loss of statistical significance to the addition of the explanatory
crime rate variables; instead, I attribute the loss of significance to the loss of the 1950
birth cohort. The limited time frame of the property and violent crime rates decreases
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Table 24: Balanced Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility and Unemployment Rate, 60 ≤ p̃ ≤
100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,6̃0 Ac,7̃0 Ac,8̃0 Ac,9̃0 Ac,1̃00
ωU,4 -0.000314 0.000811 0.00455 0.00425 -0.00307
(0.00268) (0.00249) (0.00274) (0.00265) (0.00459)
1980.cohort -0.121*** -0.117*** -0.110*** -0.0933*** -0.0609***
(0.00487) (0.00438) (0.00551) (0.00607) (0.00870)
Constant 0.566*** 0.529*** 0.460*** 0.385*** 0.168***
(0.0173) (0.0159) (0.0168) (0.0170) (0.0293)
Observations 86 86 86 86 86
R-squared 0.941 0.947 0.904 0.858 0.543
Number of state code 43 43 43 43 43
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the number of observations in the regression. In summary, the panel regression results
for the relationship between the rate of absolute income mobility and the ten-year
average cyclical component (as a share of trend), conditional on state and cohort
dummies, yields the most definitive and interesting results.
5.3 Implications, Limitations, and Areas for Future Research
A positive fluctuation in the business cycle increases the percentage chance of a child
achieving the American Dream (by earning an income higher than the income their
parents earned) conditional on the parental income percentile rank. That these effects
pertain to middle and relatively high-income households is interesting, particularly
if, as I argue, the availability of credit underlies the transmission mechanism from
cyclical fluctuations to economic mobility. One implication of my research is that
middle- and high-income households rely on credit to finance investment in human
capital to an extent that relatively low-income households do not.
Another implication of my research is the importance of stabilization policies that
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Table 25: Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility on Real Personal Income and Crime, 10 ≤ p̃ ≤ 50
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,1̃0 Ac,2̃0 Ac,3̃0 Ac,4̃0 Ac,5̃0
ωY,10 0.0399 0.0293 0.0344 0.0280 0.0431**
(0.0334) (0.0228) (0.0282) (0.0281) (0.0198)
pcrime -1.72e-06 -6.33e-06 -8.03e-07 -3.17e-06 -7.03e-06
(1.04e-05) (1.30e-05) (1.25e-05) (1.31e-05) (1.15e-05)
vcrime -1.55e-05 1.14e-05 3.14e-06 -1.19e-05 -2.45e-05
(5.55e-05) (5.87e-05) (5.16e-05) (4.74e-05) (5.11e-05)
1970.cohort -0.0244 -0.0433* -0.0680*** -0.0705*** -0.0780***
(0.0206) (0.0242) (0.0218) (0.0242) (0.0204)
1980.cohort -0.0905*** -0.144*** -0.177*** -0.184*** -0.181***
(0.0285) (0.0291) (0.0300) (0.0330) (0.0278)
Constant 0.803*** 0.746*** 0.704*** 0.698*** 0.698***
(0.0280) (0.0293) (0.0304) (0.0316) (0.0266)
Observations 129 129 129 129 129
R-squared 0.752 0.871 0.900 0.916 0.934
Number of state code 43 43 43 43 43
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 26: Panel Regressions of State-Level Mobility on Real Personal Income and Crime, 60 ≤ p̃ ≤
100
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Ac,6̃0 Ac,7̃0 Ac,8̃0 Ac,9̃0 Ac,1̃00
ωY,10 0.0179 0.0342 0.0308 0.0316* 0.0240
(0.0129) (0.0232) (0.0208) (0.0167) (0.0207)
pcrime 1.05e-06 8.87e-06 1.80e-05 7.38e-06 1.28e-05
(9.57e-06) (1.00e-05) (1.08e-05) (1.04e-05) (1.55e-05)
vcrime 1.47e-05 -3.99e-05 -5.41e-05 -8.01e-06 6.96e-06
(4.32e-05) (5.02e-05) (4.70e-05) (5.94e-05) (9.37e-05)
1970.cohort -0.0923*** -0.103*** -0.110*** -0.0856*** -0.0157
(0.0181) (0.0200) (0.0204) (0.0191) (0.0332)
1980.cohort -0.210*** -0.210*** -0.216*** -0.173*** -0.0761*
(0.0230) (0.0265) (0.0273) (0.0252) (0.0443)
Constant 0.643*** 0.610*** 0.540*** 0.465*** 0.105***
(0.0213) (0.0253) (0.0248) (0.0216) (0.0310)
Observations 129 129 129 129 129
R-squared 0.944 0.934 0.911 0.853 0.306
Number of state code 43 43 43 43 43
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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help reduce the impact of an economic shock. A negative economic shock causes
a multitude of effects; my research emphasizes the decrease in the rate of absolute
mobility when the negative economic shock occurs in the early years of a child’s
life. During recessions, the decrease in any component of aggregate demand lowers
the price level and the amount of output and so too an individual’s level of savings.
Therefore, a parent who relies on borrowing to invest in the human capital of their
child is unable to secure loans, limiting the child’s ability to earn income. In order
to maintain the health of the economy, economists implement stabilization policies
that lessen the effect of negative economic shocks and maintain the ease of access to
credit.
There are several types of economic policy that reduce the effects of negative
aggregate shocks. Expansionary fiscal policy directly affects aggregate demand by
increasing government spending and cutting taxes. Each of these options potentially
increases output and, therefore, savings. Monetary policy indirectly affects aggregate
demand through the interest rate. The Federal Reserve System controls the money
supply and interest rates. The Federal Reserve System implements expansionary
monetary policy by increasing the money supply, perhaps by purchasing Treasury
bonds, resulting in a decrease in the level of interest rates. Relatively low interest
rates stimulate investments (perhaps in human capital) and household consumption.
Each of these channels reduces the severity of negative economic shocks and main-
tains households’ access to credit. Therefore, stabilization policies that help maintain
a stable economy also help maintain investment in the human capital of children,
thereby maintaining their rates of absolute income mobility.
Some limitations of my research include the type of data available, my de-trending
method, how I adjust for inflation, and potential endogeneity problems. The first
limitation of my research is the lack of available state-level data. Real GDP is the
most common economic variable used to evaluate fluctuations of the real economy.
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Therefore, the ideal state-level measure is real GSP, which is analogous to real GDP.
Unfortunately, real GSP is not available during the time frame I am interested in at
a quarterly frequency, so I use real personal income. A second limitation is that I use
the HP-filter to recover the cyclical and trend components of real personal income;
this is one of several de-trending methods. While the HP-filter is conventional, it
is simply a smoothing algorithm that does not account for the fundamental forces
driving the trend component. Other de-trending methods may yield different results
in my panel regressions. Additionally, I use the national consumer price index to
adjust for inflation in each state. Although this is a reasonable way to account
for changes in the price level, state-level measures of the consumer price index may
provide different results. And finally, I use conventional panel regression for a dataset
that includes many more states than it does time periods. Thus, a dynamic panel
regression technique may be appropriate.
That economic fluctuations drive the rate of absolute mobility suggests one area for
future research is how state-level economic stabilization policy might affect state-level
economic fluctuations and, thus, maintain a healthy state-level economy. A second
area for future research is the role of state- and local-government investment in the
human capital of children. Understanding the ways state and local governments can
best invest in the human capital of children would provide additional insight into how
a child’s ability to earn income is determined. Finally, a third area for future research
is how state-level variation in usury laws shape the availability of credit across states.
6 Conclusion
In this thesis, I test my central hypothesis that aggregate economic fluctuations—
business cycles—shape intergenerational economic mobility. I argue that these cycles
create countercyclical credit constraints for households that rely on credit to invest
in the human capital of their children. Thus, these constraints effectively limit the
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foundational skills and expected earnings of the child. My working measure of in-
tergenerational mobility is the rate of absolute income mobility, which measures the
fraction of adult children who earn more than their parents earned, conditional on
the parent’s income rank in their income distribution. According to Chetty et al.
(2017, p.1), earning more than our parents did is “one of the defining features of the
American Dream.”
To test my hypothesis, I exploit heterogenous state-level economic fluctuations. I
show that aggregate economic shocks do not flow through the economy uniformly. In
fact, short-run fluctuations measured by gross state product, real personal income,
and the unemployment rate, vary across states in terms of timing, amplitude, and
duration. I use this variation, along with variation in state-level rates of absolute
income mobility of children in 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1980 birth cohorts, to construct
a panel dataset. Thus, for my panel regressions, I pair a state-level estimate of the rate
of absolute income mobility for a particular birth cohort—the dependent variable—
with a state-level measure of the business cycle during the decade following the cohort
year, when children in the birth cohort are heavily dependent on their parents.
Overall, I find that variation in state-level business cycles measured as the ten-year
average cyclical component (as a share of trend) of state-level real personal income
yield the most precise and interesting results: average cyclical fluctuations in the
economy in which children lived between the ages of 0 and 18 drive to some extent
their average rate of absolute income mobility through adulthood. My results are
statistically significant in the cases where parental income percentile ranks equal 50,
70, 80, and 90.
I conclude that aggregate fluctuations drive rates of absolute mobility for middle-
to high-income households. One possible implication of these results is that house-
holds that rely most on credit markets to fund investment in the human capital of
their child rank in middle- to high-income percentiles. Put differently, credit-rationing
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constrains only households that can access credit in the first place. I also measure the
state-level business cycle as the five-year average cyclical component (as a share of
trend) of state-level real personal income and as the average unemployment rate, both
during the child’s formative early years. In these cases, my results are not statistically
significant.
The positive relationship between business cycles (during childhood) and Ameri-
can dreams (during adulthood) implies the importance of household access to capital
and, thus, macroeconomic stabilization policies that maintain a well-functioning econ-
omy, complete with an ample supply of credit. Moreover, given the heterogeneity of
state-level aggregate economic outcomes that I demonstrate, macroeconomic stabi-
lization policies tailored to state-level economic circumstances seem appropriate. My
results broadly support state-level automatic stabilizers—in the form of direct stimu-
lus payments to households, say—triggered by a state-level recession indicator, such
as an appropriately modified Sahm rule for example.
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